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Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial 
Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth 
Amendment 
Laura I. Appleman* 
Abstract 
In a criminal system that tips heavily to the side of wealth 
and power, we routinely detain the accused in often horrifying 
conditions, confined in jails while still maintaining the 
presumption of innocence. Here, in the rotting jail cells of 
impoverished defendants, lies the Shadowlands of Justice, where 
the lack of criminal procedure has produced a darkness unrelieved 
by much scrutiny or concern on the part of the law.  
This Article contends that our current system of pretrial 
detention lies in shambles, routinely incarcerating the accused in 
horrifying conditions often far worse than those of convicted 
offenders in prisons. Due to these punitive conditions of 
incarceration, pretrial detainees appear to have a cognizable claim 
for the denial of their Sixth Amendment jury trial right, which, at 
its broadest, forbids punishment for any crime unless a cross-
section of the offender’s community adjudicates his crime and 
finds him guilty. This Article argues that the spirit of the Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right might apply to many pretrial 
detainees, due to both the punishment-like conditions of their 
incarceration and the unfair procedures surrounding bail grants, 
denials and revocations. In so arguing, I expose some of the worst 
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abuses of current procedures surrounding bail and jail in both 
federal and state systems. Additionally, I propose some much 
needed reforms in the pretrial release world, including better 
oversight of the surety bond system, reducing prison overcrowding 
by increasing electronic bail surveillance, and revising the bail 
hearing procedure to permit a community “bail jury” to help 
decide the defendant’s danger to the community. 
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I. Introduction: Diplomats, Detention, and Punishment 
Notwithstanding crime, the decision to imprison a defendant 
before trial all too often hinges on wealth and power. For 
example, a promiscuous foreign diplomat is halted at the airport, 
ready to flee the country, after allegedly sexually assaulting a 
hotel chambermaid, and initially denied bail, but then is 
permitted to reside in a posh penthouse while electronically 
monitored, serving an extremely upscale version of “house 
arrest.”1 A lifestyle maven charged with perpetuating insider 
trading pleads not guilty and is released without bail, along with 
her stockbroker.2 A well-known money manager, accused of 
                                                                                                     
 1. James Barron, Strauss-Kahn Is Released from Jail, N.Y. TIMES, May 
20, 2011, at A6. 
 2. Richard Esposito, Betsy Stark & Ramona Schindelheim, Martha 
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running a $50 billion Ponzi scheme, is permitted basic freedom of 
movement within several states while awaiting trial, even after 
confessing to the crime and failing to live up to his original $10 
million bail terms.3 A prominent governor is charged with serious 
corruption and is not only released on minimal bail,4 but is even 
allowed to take part in a Donald Trump reality show while 
charges are still pending.5 A wealthy couple charged with 
enslaving and brutally mistreating two young maids—including 
starving, beating, and torturing—are permitted pretrial release6 
with electronic monitoring, due in part to their ability to afford a 
specialized security firm that functions as private bail guards for 
the very wealthy.7 And a well-known alleged Mafia boss, charged 
with various racketeering charges (and suspected of inducing a 
variety of violent crimes as acting boss), is released on a $10 
million bail, an oath to wear an electronic bracelet, and a guard 
at his Oyster Bay, Long Island mansion.8  
                                                                                                     
Stewart Pleads Not Guilty, Resigns, ABC NEWS, June 4, 2003, http://abc 
news.go.com/Business/story?id=86245&page=1 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. Alex Berenson, Authorities Ease Madoff’s Bail Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
18, 2008, at B1.  
 4. Blagojevich Free on $4500 Bail After Arrest, CNN, Dec. 9, 2008, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2008-12-09/politics/illinois.governor_1_76-page-affidavit-
senate-seat-rod-blagojevich?_s=PM:POLITICS (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 5. Emily Miller, Rod Blagojevich Will Star on ‘Celebrity Apprentice’ 
Despite Prosecutors’ Concerns, POLITICS DAILY, Jan. 5, 2010, 
http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/01/05/rod-blagojevich-scheduled-for-celebrity-
apprentice-despite-pro/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 6. Amrita Rajan, Long Island Indian Couple in Slavery Case Get Bail, 
DESICRITICS.ORG, May 31, 2007, http://desicritics.org/2007/05/31/135057.php 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 7. Alan Feuer, Bail Sitters, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2009, at MB1. These 
kinds of “bail sitting” jobs often require bullet-proof vests, electronic ankle 
bracelet monitoring, and “the deployment of a chase car, a digital voice recorder, 
a broadband wireless router, several metal door bars and a high-resolution, 
vandal-resistant Nuvico day/night camera—the one with the plastic dome and 
manual zoom lens.” Id.  
 8. Joseph Berger, John Gotti’s Son Is Freed on Bail of Ten Million, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 2, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/02/nyregion/john-gotti-s-
son-is-freed-on-bail-of-10-million.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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In contrast, a New Jersey barber is pulled over and arrested 
for a backlog of unpaid parking tickets and failing to register his 
new car. After his arrest, unable to make his $1000 bail, he is 
sent to serve his pretrial detention at a local halfway house, 
where he is robbed and murdered by three inmates for the three 
dollars in his pockets.9 His predicament is all too common. The 
average defendant in pretrial detention has either committed a 
minor crime and cannot afford to pay the set amount of bail, or 
has somehow triggered a preventative detention hold—despite 
the fact that the science of predicting dangerousness can be 
dubious. Incarcerated, this impoverished defendant has little 
ability to contact an attorney or plan a defense. And this 
impoverished defendant is captive to a justice system that 
regularly allows commercial bail bondsmen to lobby against 
pretrial release based on inexpensive electronic monitoring, 
simply to increase their profits. 
Although most convicted offenders are incarcerated at state 
or federal prisons, detainees are typically housed in local or 
municipal jails where “resources are scarcer, the staff is ‘less 
professionalized,’ classification of inmates is haphazard, and 
rapid turnover makes for generally chaotic conditions.”10 Once 
the average, nonprivileged, indicted defendant is detained, he is 
subject to all sorts of punitive conditions, as the state of many 
halfway houses and metropolitan and rural jails are truly 
reprehensible, even when measured against prisons. Frequently, 
these detention centers are vastly overcrowded. Abuse and even 
murder of pretrial detainees, either by guards or other 
prisoners, is endemic. Various infections and serious illnesses 
all too often rage unabated in local and county jails, with 
minimal health services provided because of the transient 
nature of the population. Often, not only are the jails 
themselves older and decaying,11 but they also have various 
                                                                                                     
 9. Sam Dolnick, At Penal House, Volatile Mix Fuels a Murder, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 19, 2012, at A1. 
 10. David Gorlin, Note, Evaluating Punishment in Purgatory: The Need to 
Separate Pretrial Detainees’ Conditions-of-Confinement Claims from Inadequate 
Eighth Amendment Analysis, 108 MICH. L. REV. 417, 419 (2009). 
 11. See AMANDA PETTERUTI & NASTASSIA WALSH, JUSTICE POLICY 
INSTITUTE, JAILING COMMUNITIES: THE IMPACT OF JAIL EXPANSION AND EFFECTIVE 
PUBLIC SAFETY STRATEGIES 15 (2008) (citing studies from the 1990s that show 
that 700 jails in the United States are older than fifty years old and 140 jails are 
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dangers associated with them, including mold, poor ventilation, 
lead pipes, and asbestos.12  
In a criminal system that tips heavily to the side of wealth 
and power, routinely detaining the accused in often horrifying 
conditions, justice is frequently nowhere to be found. Here, in the 
rotting jail cells of impoverished defendants—still innocent before 
proven guilty—are the Shadowlands of Justice: the murky 
corners of the criminal justice system, where the lack of criminal 
procedure has produced a darkness unrelieved by much scrutiny 
or concern on the part of the law. 
Our current framework of constitutional criminal procedure 
has primarily focused on the treatment of offenders once the trial 
or plea proceeding has begun and, to a lesser extent, once these 
offenders have been convicted and sent to prison. But until very 
recently, little attention has been paid to the plight of those 
pretrial defendants languishing in the intermediate world of jails. 
In part, this is due to the classification of a pretrial offender’s 
treatment as “detention,” as opposed to “punishment.” As I will 
argue, however, the conditions of most pretrial detention differ 
little from punitive incarceration, subjecting these offenders to 
the worst of conditions without even a guilty verdict. 
As such, these pretrial detainees would appear to have a 
cognizable claim for the denial of their Sixth Amendment jury 
trial right, which, at its broadest, forbids punishment for any 
crime unless a cross-section of the offender’s community 
adjudicates his crime and finds him guilty. This Article explores 
how the animating principles of the Sixth Amendment 
community jury trial right would apply to defendants who are 
held under pretrial detention. In doing so, I look specifically at 
the procedures surrounding indicted offenders who are denied 
bail and confined in jail. 
In Blakely v. Washington,13 the Supreme Court clarified that 
a jury must determine any imposition of punishment.14 The 
                                                                                                     
more than 100 years old). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004) (holding that a 
state trial court’s sentence of more than three years above the statutory 
maximum “did not comply with the Sixth Amendment”).  
 14. See id. at 304 (“When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict 
alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts ‘which the law makes 
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realities of bail and jail in today’s criminal justice system, 
however, dictate that punishment is often imposed by nonjury, 
nonjudicial, and occasionally, private actors, such as bail 
bondsmen, probation officers, and correction officials. In other 
words, conditions tantamount to punishment are imposed, far 
from the oversight imagined by the Framers of the Constitution, 
and violating the true spirit of the Sixth Amendment jury trial 
right. 
Although bail and detention was a popular scholarly topic a 
generation ago, only a few contemporary legal academics have 
scrutinized the current machinations of pretrial release,15 with 
existing scholarship primarily focusing on Fourth, Fifth, or 
Eighth Amendment violations. None, however, have analyzed the 
results of the changes in pretrial release standards and the 
increasing relevance of the Sixth Amendment. This Article aims 
to fill that gap by studying the problems of our current pretrial 
detention system through a Sixth Amendment lens.  
I contend that the spirit of the Sixth Amendment jury trial 
right might apply to many pretrial detainees, due to both the 
punishment-like conditions of their incarceration and the unfair 
procedures surrounding bail grants, denials, and revocations. In 
doing so, I also expose some of the worst abuses of current 
procedures surrounding bail and jail in both federal and state 
systems. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II of this Article 
exposes the often intolerable and primitive conditions of state and 
local jails, which end up punishing all those incarcerated in them, 
whether convicted or not. Part III traces the history of pretrial 
detention, focusing as well on the resurgence of the Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right. Part IV explores how pretrial 
confinement has become a kind of punishment imposed 
inconsistently, by fluctuating actors, and without proper 
predictive basis. This part focuses on both the failures of the 1984 
Bail Reform Act as well as the complete lack of predictability that 
                                                                                                     
essential to punishment.’”). 
 15. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran & Frank McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 497, 499–556; Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of 
Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 724–76 (2011); Marc Miller & Martin 
Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 344 
(1990). 
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the current dangerousness formula possesses. Part IV also 
discusses how the current system of bail and jail entirely 
bypasses the community role in both imposing punishment and 
creating a safer living area. Finally, Part V introduces some 
much needed reforms in the pretrial release world, including 
reforming the surety bond system, reducing prison overcrowding 
by increasing electronic bail surveillance, and revising the bail 
hearing procedure to permit a community “bail jury” to help 
decide the defendant’s danger to the community. 
Only recently has the national and local media shined a 
spotlight on both bail and jail procedures and their conditions 
and failures, exposing a dark corner of the criminal justice 
system where procedural fairness and due process are limited 
and sometimes nonexistent. This Article hopes to add a scholarly 
dimension to these troubling exposés, illustrating how pretrial 
detention violates the spirit of the Sixth Amendment and creates 
a Shadowlands within criminal justice. 
II. Pretrial Detention as Punishment 
Pretrial detention in the twenty-first century has evolved 
from a brief containment for a few accused deemed exceptionally 
dangerous to punishment for large numbers of accused awaiting 
trial. The combination of inhumane and degrading conditions, a 
corrupt and unregulated system of bail surety, bail bondsmen, 
and bounty hunters, and rising numbers of detainees, with the 
general absence of criminal due process in the pretrial realm, has 
resulted in a criminal justice system that punishes before it 
convicts. This contradicts the requirements of even our minimal 
pretrial protection for defendants, which holds that punishment 
can only occur after a conviction.16 Punishing the accused before 
she is proven guilty violates every theory of punishment, but 
particularly retributive justice, which requires that punishment 
can only be imposed after a cross-section of the community has 
pronounced guilt—a far cry from the pretrial detention system we 
have now. Although the abuses of pretrial detention are 
                                                                                                     
 16. See Bell v. Wolfish, 447 U.S. 520, 536–37 (1979) (holding that due 
process requires that pretrial detainees be free from “punishment”). 
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beginning to garner media attention, only a little scholarly 
attention has been paid.17 It is time to remedy this oversight. 
A. Bail Bondsmen, Bounty Hunters, and Corrupt Incentives 
Our current bail system is by-and-large unregulated and 
plagued with corruption. First, numerous offenders languish in 
local jails for weeks for committing mere misdemeanors, simply 
because they lack the funds to post bail.18 In New York City, for 
example, most of these charges are for minor quality-of-life 
offenses, such as smoking marijuana in public, jumping a subway 
turnstile, or shoplifting, and bail was set at $1,000 or less.19 Yet, 
the overwhelming majority of defendants are unable to muster 
funds and are sent to jail, where they remain, “on average, for 
more than two weeks.”20 In a 2010 study, eighty-seven percent of 
the low-income defendants who were not released on their own 
recognizance were unable to post bail and went to jail to await 
guilty pleas or trial.21 
What is even more disturbing is that many of the poorer 
defendants may have pled guilty at arraignment for sentences 
with no jail time, simply to avoid being behind bars while 
awaiting trial.22 Impoverished defendants will often accept a 
guilty plea, even if innocent, in order to gain release from pretrial 
detention, even if this injures their long-term prospects.23 
                                                                                                     
 17. See, e.g., Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 15; Baradaran, supra note 
15. 
 18. Mosi Secret, N.Y.C. Misdemeanor Defendants Lack Bail Money, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2010, at A27. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. (finding that 87% of defendants whose bail was set at $1,000 or 
less did not post bail). 
 21. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL 
DETENTION OF NONFELONY LOW-INCOME DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (2010), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_ 
0.pdf. 
 22. See id. at 2–3 (“Most persons accused of low level offenses when faced 
with a bail amount they cannot make will accept a guilty plea; if they do not 
plea at arraignment, they will do so after having been in detention a week or 
two.”). 
 23. Laura Sullivan, Bail Burden Keeps U.S. Jails Stuffed with Inmates, 
NPR, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.npr.org/2010/01/21/122725771/Bail-Burden-
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Inability to muster the appropriate funds for bail is not just a 
problem for misdemeanor felony defendants. Judges often set 
money bail at an amount the defendant cannot afford. In New 
York, for example, only ten percent of defendants in all criminal 
cases in which bail is set are able to post it at arraignment.24 This 
is despite the fact that many states have laws that establish a 
preference for nonfinancial conditions of release or unsecured 
bonds.25  
The existence of commercial surety bonds, or secured bonds, 
does not help low-income defendants. Commercial bondsmen 
rarely lend bail money of $1,000 or less, and their services are 
usually too expensive for low-income or indigent offenders.26 
Likewise, secured bonds are often not accessible for poor 
defendants, who usually do not have the property available to 
secure such bonds, or friends with such assets.27 Under one 
bondsman’s system, to obtain bail for even a minor felony or 
misdemeanor charge an indicted defendant must pay cash out of 
pocket, sign a twenty-page contract, and initial eighty-six 
separate paragraphs.28  
If a defendant is fortunate enough to even qualify for secured 
bonds, then she must face the web of complex and innumerable 
fees charged for simple regulation. For example, in New York, a 
bondsman often charges the defendant a fee of $250 if the 
defendant misses a weekly check-in, and as much as $375 per 
                                                                                                     
Keeps-U-S-Jails-Stuffed-With-Inmates (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 24. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 21, at 4. 
 25. See id. The federal government and the District of Columbia prohibit 
courts from imposing money bail that defendants cannot meet and which 
therefore results in their pretrial detention. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2006). 
 26. See MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, MAKING BAIL 
IN NEW YORK CITY: COMMERCIAL BONDS AND CASH BAIL 6 (2010) (interviewing 
fourteen detainees with low bail amounts who were turned down by the 
bondsman). Bond agents typically charge a 10% fee for the first $3,000, 8% for 
the next $7,000, and 6% for amounts over $10,000. The fee is not refunded. 
Bondsmen also require collateral, typically cash, which is refunded unless bail is 
forfeited for failure to appear. See id. at 3. 
 27. In New York, for example, criminal procedure law authorizes the use of 
secured bail bonds secured by personal and real property; the surety may be 
provided by the defendant himself or someone other than the defendant. 
 28. John Eligon, For Poor, Bail System Can Be an Obstacle to Freedom, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011, at A15 [hereinafter Eligon, Bail System]. 
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hour for obscure tasks like bail consulting and research.29 These 
specified fees can grow much greater when bail bondsmen are 
assigned to other tasks, such as obtaining court documents or 
delivering release papers to jail.30 
Even if an indicted defendant can afford a commercial surety 
bond, these commercial bonds are almost entirely unregulated 
and often corrupt. At the frontiers of criminal justice, bail 
bondsmen hold an immense amount of power over the bailees, 
despite the bondsmen’s lack of legal, political, or police authority. 
Far from having a jury or a judge decide whether an indicted 
defendant should be incarcerated and punished, these bail 
bondsmen make such decisions in a completely unstructured 
universe, where they are both judge and jury. This kind of 
unauthorized decision-making surely violates the spirit of the 
Sixth Amendment, which at its very core requires legal conviction 
before punishment. 
More troubling are the vast amounts, sometimes thousands 
of dollars, that a bail bondsman may charge if he makes the 
decision to revoke bail and return the defendant to jail.31 These 
decisions, made entirely on the bondsman’s own accord, with no 
regulation from any judicial, police, or legal authority, end up not 
only returning the defendant to jail but also costing him and his 
family a large percentage of the deposited bond, which is forfeited 
when the defendant is surrendered on the sole decision of the 
bondsman. 
There are few state laws regulating when it is permissible for 
a bondsman to surrender a defendant, which leaves the bail 
system open to manipulation. New York bondsmen, among 
others, have been returning defendants to jail for questionable or 
unspecified reasons, and then withholding thousands of dollars to 
which the bondsmen may not be entitled.32  
Because most state laws allow bondsmen to enter into 
private contracts with the people they bail out, it is hard for 
judges to regulate their behavior. And even in states that afford 
                                                                                                     
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. (noting that one bondsman returned eighty-nine bailees over a 
four-month period and pocketed 15% of the bail when doing so).  
 32. See id.  
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some regulatory supervision, judges rarely take advantage of it. 
For example, in New York, although state law allows judicial 
consideration of the bondsman’s background, character, and 
reputation when deciding whether to accept a bond, a judge 
rarely denies bond because of improper behavior.33  
Instead of helping defendants stay out of jail, some bail 
bondsmen take advantage of the situation and disadvantage 
defendants to an even further degree.34 In other words, as 
described by a New York attorney familiar with these sorts of 
abuses, an indicted offender “can be ordered imprisoned by a 
court based solely on the unsworn, untested word of a non-law-
enforcement civilian, a civilian who stands to profit financially if 
the defendant is incarcerated.”35 This type of entirely 
unregulated, potentially improper bond revocation, requiring the 
defendant to return to jail on the whims of a private actor, is yet 
another example of how the world of pretrial detention operates 
at the fringes of justice. 
If bailees fail to appear for their hearings, the bondsman 
owes the entire bail amount to the court.36 This kind of financial 
liability has led to many bondsmen employing recovery agents, 
usually known as bounty hunters, to ensure that these indicted 
defendants appear for their court dates.37 The last time the 
Supreme Court addressed the role of bounty hunters and 
bondsmen—one hundred and fifty years ago38—it acknowledged 
the historical common law privileges of both bondsmen and 
bounty hunters, holding that the right to apprehend a fleeing 
defendant originates from the contract relationship between 
bondsmen and their clients.39 Despite vast changes in both 
                                                                                                     
 33. See John Eligon, New York Is Owed More than 2 Million Dollars in 
Delinquent Forfeitures, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011, at A18. 
 34. See Eligon, Bail System, supra note 28 (recounting abuses of N.Y.C. bail 
bondsmen that have been investigated by the New York State Insurance 
Department).  
 35. Id.  
 36. See Stephen N. Freeland, Note, The Invisible Badge: Why Bounty 
Hunters Should Be Regarded as State Actors Under the Symbiotic Relationship 
Test, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 201, 207 (2010). 
 37. See id.  
 38. Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371 (1872).  
 39. See id. at 370–71. The Taylor Court noted that bounty hunters could 
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criminal law and procedure, however, the Court has not 
addressed the topic since. 
Bounty hunters do have a few regulations on their behavior, 
mostly codified in state law, though they vary widely from state 
to state.40 Despite persistent effort, however, attempts to control 
bounty hunters through federal legislation have failed.41 As 
should not be surprising in such a “wild west,” behavior of some 
bounty hunters can be reprehensible. Beyond the showy brutality 
spotlighted in such reality shows as “Dog the Bounty Hunter,”42 
the rules and prohibitions that constrain the police do not 
generally apply to bounty hunters.43 As a result, misconduct often 
occurs as bounty hunters take advantage of their legal 
privileges.44 
Bounty hunters look and act like police, but lack the 
screening and training that law enforcement provides its 
                                                                                                     
“seize [delinquent defendants] at any time, detain them until trial, pursue them 
across state lines, and even break into their homes if necessary.” Id. at 371. 
Some scholars, however, have argued that this statement by the Taylor Court is 
only dicta, and not binding on modern-day courts. See, e.g., Todd Barsumian, 
Note, Bail Bondsmen and Bounty Hunters: Re-Examining the Right to 
Recapture, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 877, 887–88 (1999) (citing Landry v. A-Able 
Bonding, Inc., No. 1:92-CV-0257, 1994 WL 575480 (E.D. Tex. May 9, 1994), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 75 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
 40. Forty-seven states have some sort of statute regulating bounty hunting. 
See Freeland, supra note 36, at 210 n.70. For example, in 1997, Indiana, 
Nevada, and North Carolina started licensing bounty hunters, and Texas began 
to require warrants for bounty hunters as well as the assistance of licensed 
private investigators/security guards. Additionally, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, 
and Oregon have banned commercial bail bond systems, and hence have no 
bounty hunters. See id. at 210 nn.66, 70. 
 41. See id. at 211–12 (noting that two bills that would have made bounty 
hunters subject to the same laws and constitutional constraints as police failed 
in the House of Representatives). 
 42. “Dog the Bounty Hunter” is a reality television show on A&E, which 
follows Duane Chapman as he hunts down defendants who have missed court 
appearances. See DOG THE BOUNTY HUNTER, http://www.dogthebounty 
hunter.com/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). The website for the show proclaims, “Considered the greatest 
bounty hunter in the world, Duane ‘Dog’ Chapman has made more than 6,000 
captures in his twenty-seven-year career.” Id.  
 43. See JACQUELINE POPE, BOUNTY HUNTERS, MARSHALS, AND SHERIFFS: 
FORWARD TO THE PAST 4 (1998) (“Rules of law and conduct under which police 
function have no relevance for bounty hunters.”). 
 44. See Freeland, supra note 36, at 212 (collecting stories of incidents). 
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recruits.45 As a result, these recovery agents use dangerous and 
sometimes illegal tactics to retrieve defendants, property, or both, 
including confrontations at gunpoint, forced entries into homes 
without a search warrant, and the commandeering of vehicles on 
public roadways.46 Indeed, in states where they are allowed to 
practice, bounty hunters can legally use stun guns, mace, and 
firearms while apprehending bailees. As a result, in the process 
of “recovering” the bailee, bounty hunters often complicate and 
endanger public safety.47 Moreover, although bounty hunters play 
a police-like role, there is little constitutional protection against 
poor behavior because they are usually not considered state 
actors.48  
In sum, the unregulated private actors, unsupervised and 
unaccountable bail bonding companies, complex and unfair fee 
structures, tremendous pressure to plead guilty, over-
incarceration for minor offenses, and disproportionately high bail 
all combine to make our system of pretrial detention a nightmare 
to navigate and constitutionally questionable. That this system 
disproportionately affects the poor makes our current pretrial 
detention system all the more disturbing. 
B. Increased Numbers of Poor Indicted Offenders Denied Bail 
At any given moment, a large proportion of jail dwellers 
consist of felony and nonfelony pretrial detainees who are in jail 
because they have not posted bail. Of the nation’s jail population, 
60.2% are detainees awaiting trial.49 Nationally, taxpayers spend 
$9 billion annually to incarcerate defendants held on bail.50 
                                                                                                     
 45. Daniel Stanton, Bondsmen Pose Danger to Public, PORTLAND TRIB., May 
12, 2011, http://www.portlandtribune.com/opinion/story.php?story_id=1305148 
91339544200 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
 48. See Freeland, supra note 36, at 228 (discussing the inadequacy of the 
logic behind distinguishing police officers and bounty hunters). 
 49. TODD D. MINTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 
2011—STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2011). 
 50. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, JANUARY–DECEMBER 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 
3 (2011). 
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The rate of pretrial incarceration (and incarceration in jails 
and other nonprison detention places in general) has continued to 
rise over the past ten years even though prison growth rates have 
been leveling off.51 Indicted offenders are less likely to be released 
pretrial.52 This includes not only those who have been indicted for 
violent offenses but also those who are awaiting trial for property, 
drug, and public-order-related charges.53 Additionally, fewer 
indicted offenders are being released from jail on their own 
recognizance, and those who have been granted bail are often 
unable to afford it.54 These types of high bail requirements make 
it very difficult for indicted defendants to obtain pretrial release, 
despite the fact that the vast majority of these offenders have 
been arrested for low-level, nonviolent offenses.55 
Despite this increasing reliance on incarcerating indicted 
defendants before trial, communities are not necessarily any 
safer. The places with the highest incarceration rates have not 
necessarily seen violent crime rates fall.56 In fact, quite to the 
contrary, New York City decreased its jail population and 
experienced a drastic reduction in crime rates.57 
As Human Rights Watch has astutely noted in discussing the 
problems with pretrial detentions in New York City: 
Time in jail before one has had one’s day in court is 
particularly troubling for the one in five detained non-felony 
defendants who . . . will not be convicted. It is also 
disproportionate in light of sentences typically imposed when 
there is a non-felony conviction: data from the New York State 
Division of Criminal Justice Services, for example, indicates 
that eight out of ten convicted misdemeanor arrestees receive 
sentences that do not include jail time.58 
                                                                                                     
 51. PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 11, at 2. 
 52. Id. at 3. 
 53. Id. Indeed, as the report notes, three-quarters of those pretrial 
detainees charged with property, drug, and public order related charges are 
“significantly less likely” to be released. Id.  
 54. Id. As the report explains: “Once, more than half of those jailed 
received bail amounts of $5,000 or less; today, just about half of the people in 
jail receive the highest bail amounts ($10,000 to the maximum).” Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 21, at 4. 
 57. See id. 
 58. Id. at 2. 
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This is disturbing in regards to the large number of pretrial 
detainees who are indicted and held on misdemeanors, as 
detailed above. Incarcerating poor defendants for nonfelony 
offenses (primarily misdemeanors, but also violations and 
infractions)59 is perhaps the most troubling aspect of this trend. 
This kind of jailing is “uniquely difficult to reconcile with the 
fundamental notions of fairness and equality that should be the 
cornerstones of criminal justice.”60 For these cases especially, 
pretrial detention is a disproportionate abbreviation of rights, 
particularly in light of the nonthreatening, petty nature of most 
of the charged nonfelony crimes.61 
The increasing rate of pretrial detention is worrying, 
however, even for those defendants charged with more serious 
crimes, due to the conditions of the actual detention centers 
housing pretrial defendants. Although state and federal prisons 
are not generally known for their plush accommodations, the 
general state of the jails that hold pretrial detainees is so bad 
that simply to be incarcerated in them rises to a punitive 
experience. 
C. The Punishing Conditions of Pretrial Detention 
The substandard conditions of today’s pretrial detention 
centers—our halfway houses and local and municipal jails—have 
transformed the detainee’s experience into a punishing one. It is 
a little-known but unfortunate truth that pretrial detainees often 
undergo harsher conditions of confinement than those defendants 
who are convicted.62 While state and federal prisons house most 
convicted prisoners, jails and county lockups house the accused 
who have either been denied bail or cannot afford to pay it. 
Moreover, pretrial detainees are often incarcerated alongside 
the ten percent of convicted criminals who are housed in jails 
rather than prisons.63 This indicates that the holding conditions 
for pretrial detainees are, at minimum, punishment-like, as it is 
                                                                                                     
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Gorlin, supra note 10, at 419. 
 63. PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 11, at 3.  
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precisely the same as that for some convicted offenders. The lines 
between prison and jail are becoming increasingly blurred, and 
not for the better.64  
Historically, determining whether certain conditions rise to 
the level of punishment requires objective indicia. Specifically, in 
Bell v. Wolfish,65 the Supreme Court held that courts can decide 
“‘whether [the detainee’s condition] has historically been 
regarded as punishment.’”66 In addition, Youngberg v. Romeo67 
held that those forcibly committed to state institutions retain 
their substantive rights under the Due Process Clause.68 As 
others have noted, the Court’s holding in Youngberg indicates 
that, by the same token, criminal pretrial detainees’ arguments 
should be analyzed objectively, instead of subjectively.69  
There are numerous objective indicia of confinement that rise 
to the level of punishment for pretrial detainees. By far the most 
concerning—but not isolated—examples come from Rikers Island 
in New York, the municipal lockup for pretrial detainees, 
immigrants, juveniles, and any prisoner subject to rehearing or 
resentencing.70 The jail on Rikers Island has been sued in recent 
years by more than a half-dozen Rikers inmates, all claiming to 
have been the victims of beatings by prisoners while guards 
ignored it, or worse, ordered the attacks.71  
                                                                                                     
 64. See id. (noting that criminals are increasingly sent to jail, not prison).  
 65. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979) (holding that courts may 
decide “‘whether [the detainee’s condition] has historically been regarded as 
punishment’”). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (holding that a mentally 
handicapped prisoner had “constitutionally protected liberty interests under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to reasonably safe conditions 
of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, and such 
minimally adequate training as reasonably may be required by these interests”). 
 68. Id. at 315–16. 
 69. Gorlin, supra note 10, at 441.  
 70. See N.Y. DEP’T OF CORRECTION, AN OVERVIEW OF NEW YORK CITY 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION FACILITIES, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doc/html/ 
about/facilities_overview.shtml (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). The Rikers Island complex contains nine 
separate centers for both sentenced defendants and pretrial detainees, including 
an adolescent male unit, detox and mental health, hospital, women and baby 
unit, misdemeanor unit, maximum security, extreme protective custody, and 
detainees unit. Id.  
 71. Benjamin Weiser, Lawsuits Suggest Pattern of Rikers Guards Looking 
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For example, in 2009, two Rikers guards were accused of 
recruiting inmates over a three-month period to assist in 
maintaining order in a housing unit for teen boys, including 
training the inmates in how to restrain and assault their victims, 
as well as deciding where and when attacks would occur.72 The 
housing unit was run much like a Mafia organization, in which 
two correction officers were the bosses.73 Even more troubling, the 
recent pattern of cases involving Rikers guards indicates that the 
management of the jail is, if not complicit in the abuses, at least 
marginally aware of it.74  
The types of punitive violations occurring at Rikers do not 
just involve misconduct by guards. For years the jail had a policy 
of strip-searching all prisoners, even nonviolent ones charged 
with minor crimes, and, over an eight-year period, roughly 
100,000 people were strip-searched after being charged with 
misdemeanors and taken to Rikers Island and other city 
correction facilities.75 A majority of the strip-searched detainees 
were charged with trespassing, shoplifting, jumping turnstiles, or 
failing to pay child support,76 minor offenses on even a 
misdemeanor scale. Considering most federal circuits have 
upheld laws banning strip-searches for detainees charged with 
minor offenses,77 this course of action violated the pretrial 
                                                                                                     
Other Way, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009, at A21.  
 72. Id. 
 73. John Eligon, Correction Officers Accused of Letting Inmates Run Rikers 
Island Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at A20. As the article explained, “guards 
reputedly sent inmates to intimidate, threaten and silence uncooperative 
prisoners with brute force. Inmates were ordered to turn over money, and their 
every move, including when they could use the bathroom, was controlled. If 
word of an assault got out, the guards would allegedly orchestrate a cover-up.” 
Id.  
 74. Weiser, supra note 71.  
 75. Michael Schmidt, City Reaches $33 Million Settlement over Strip 
Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, at A22.  
 76. See id.  
 77. See, e.g., Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(noting other cases where officers were required to have reasonable suspicion to 
strip search minor offenders); Doe v. Burnham, 6 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 1993) (“‘Law 
enforcement officers may not strip search an individual for contraband unless 
the officers have a reasonable basis to believe at the time of the search that the 
individual is concealing contraband on his or her body.’” (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 
(7th Cir. 1983))). 
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detainees’ Fourth Amendment rights and created an atmosphere of 
fear and punishment. 
Jails in other major metropolitan areas are rife with similar 
abuses. The Los Angeles County Men’s Central Jail is notorious for 
overcrowding, forcing inmates to sleep on dirty floors, devoid of 
natural light, where inmates get only one two-hour outdoor 
recreation session per week on the jail’s roof.78 In Maricopa 
County’s Tent City Jail, in Phoenix, Arizona, inmates are housed 
outdoors in military tents without air conditioning (despite over 
100 degree temperatures in the summers), fed 15-cent meals only 
twice a day to cut costs, are forced to wear humiliating prison gear, 
and have very few amenities.79 And in Washington, D.C.’s Central 
Detention Facility, there is overcrowding, serious health and 
sanitation issues (including broken showers, no running water in 
cells, and animal feces throughout the facility), and inadequate 
healthcare.80 All this is in addition to the abuse that pretrial 
detainees can be subjected to in jails, ranging from violent 
treatment by other prisoners to more institutionalized practices.  
On a somewhat less deadly scale, but still punitive in nature, 
are the fees now imposed on poor detainees by many jails. In 
Florida, for example, fees are imposed for the use of the public 
defender for misdemeanors,81 which tend to include a large section 
of pretrial detainees who often cannot afford the fees to make 
bail.82 Adding a $50 fee to even consult a public defender83 
undoubtedly has a chilling effect on many of these indicted 
offenders, who may go without counsel due to an inability to 
afford the fee. Moreover, failure to use the public defender can 
then lead to a cascade of effects, particularly for driving violations 
including court-ordered fees, followed by failure to pay, which can 
lead to more fees, more unlicensed driving, and sometimes 
incarceration.84 Under Florida and North Carolina law, there are 
                                                                                                     
 78. PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 11, at 19.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT THE NEW YORK UNIV. 
LAW SCH., THE HIDDEN COST OF FLORIDA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES 4, 6 (2010), 
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 82. Id. at 4.  
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 84. Id. at 4. 
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no exceptions or waivers for the indigent,85 and the waiver is 
rarely utilized in Georgia.86 
Likewise, in Louisiana, fees for using the public defender are 
imposed after the bail hearing.87 All of the criminal courts of 
Orleans Parish impose fines and fees regardless of an indicted 
defendant’s ability to pay them, and waiver is rarely granted.88 
For very poor defendants who often cannot come up with bail 
money, the imposition of another fee on top of the bail fee, for 
simply consulting the public defender, results in a fee-based 
punishment. This is exacerbated by the fact that when 
defendants are unable to pay their fines, fees, and costs, they may 
be incarcerated—even if they have been found not guilty of their 
original crime.89 Once incarcerated, the indigent defendant is 
even less likely to be able to pay the fees, which compound, 
leading to higher debt and longer incarceration.90 Because they 
can only afford to pay small amounts of their incomes to redeem 
their fees, many of these men and women can remain caught up 
in the criminal justice system for years, and they may find 
themselves back in jail when their legal debts become 
overwhelming.91 
In impoverished states such as Michigan, some pretrial 
detainees are assessed a $12 jail entry fee, $60 per day for jail 
room and board, and additional reimbursement to the 
correctional facility for medical and other services.92 One jail in 
Michigan requires the defendant to pay a $12 fee to be released 
from jail.93 So for an indigent pretrial detainee who cannot afford 
                                                                                                     
 85. Id. at 7. 
 86. ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTOR PRISONS 62 
(2010). Georgia requires a $50 fee from all poor criminal defendants, including 
pretrial detainees, who simply request the services of a public defender. See id. 
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simply waive their right to counsel. See id.  
 87. Id. at 17. The public defender fee is usually $40. Id.  
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 91. See id. at 21. 
 92. See id. at 30.  
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to meet bail, extra costs are imposed, even if the original charges 
ultimately are not proven or are dropped.  
Similarly, states such as Ohio frequently impose “pay-to-
stay” programs on pretrial detainees. It took a federal lawsuit to 
stop an Ohio municipal jail from requiring detainees to pay a 
daily fee for their preconviction jail time.94 A comparable 
payment program for pretrial detainees also existed in Georgia 
until recently, in which the sheriff of Clinch County routinely 
charged pretrial detainees for the costs of room and board well 
before conviction.95 In certain cases, the sheriff even forced 
detainees to choose between signing a promissory note (to be later 
enforced) or being returned to jail.96 This practice only stopped 
with the initiation of a federal lawsuit, which settled in 2006.97 
These practices, taken together, have done much to 
transform pretrial detention into a modern-day debtor’s prison, 
and transformed it from a regulatory to a punitive experience. 
                                                                                                     
the “only lockup facility in the county to hold people on initial arrests or those 
sentenced to time for a year or less.” SAGINAW COUNTY, SAGINAW COUNTY 
MICHIGAN JAIL, available at http://www.saginawcounty.com/Sheriff/Corrections/ 
Jail.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 94. See ACLU, supra note 85, at 53. The Hamilton County Jail, in Ohio, 
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District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found this violated pretrial 
detainees’ right to the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, 
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cover “booking fee” violated defendants’ due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 95. ACLU, supra note 86, at 56.  
 96. Id. at 56–57.  
 97. See Complaint, Williams v. Clinch County, Ga., 231 F.R.D. 700 (M.D. 
Ga. 2004) (No. 7:04cv00124); Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 
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7:04cv00124); see also Greg Bluestein, South Georgia County to Repay Inmates 
Saddled with ‘Jail Bills’, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 8, 2006) available at 
http://www.schr.org/node/119 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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D. Pretrial Incarcerative Harm 
The offenders who are incarcerated pretrial suffer 
unquestionable harm from this detention.98 In general, 
incarceration in jail negatively impacts the mental and physical 
health, employment, and family and community interactions of 
those incarcerated.99 Pretrial incarceration is also particularly 
difficult for those indicted offenders who suffer from poor health, 
as jails rarely have adequate resources available to treat people 
with physical or mental health problems.100 Additionally, the poor 
have a much thinner safety net keeping them from homelessness 
and abject poverty, and being incarcerated for potential crimes, 
even for a short time, can have a devastating effect.101 
Moreover, jails can be dangerous and unhealthy 
environments, even more so than prisons. First, the jail buildings 
themselves are often old and decaying.102 These old buildings can 
have various dangers associated with them, including mold, poor 
ventilation, lead pipes, and asbestos, all of which can be very 
detrimental to the health of pretrial detainees.103 Second, the 
concentration of prisoners, wardens, and visitors in a jail make it 
a vector of contagious diseases.104 This is in large part because 
serious infections and sexually transmitted diseases are highly 
concentrated and easily transmitted in jails,105 and the ever-
changing detainee population means the residents are constantly 
in flux.106 For example, the MRSA drug-resistant superbug has 
been thriving in jails, with the potential to infect those detainees 
who are there even for only a short time.107 Many jails are not 
                                                                                                     
 98. See Gorlin, supra note 10, at 419.  
 99. See PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 11, at 3. 
 100. Id. 
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properly equipped to treat serious health problems in their 
detainees, and what healthcare is available is hard to provide to 
jails’ often short-term visitors.108 
Drug and alcohol addiction and mental illness are an equally 
large problem in jails. There is minimal, if any, drug treatment, 
although as many as half or more of those arrested and detained 
have had issues with drug addiction, alcohol addiction, or both.109 
And ever since the wave of deinstitutionalizing the mentally ill 
thirty years ago, a large number of the jails’ residents are 
mentally unstable.110 
This is troubling for a number of reasons. First, 
incarceration—even short-term incarceration such as pretrial 
detention—tends to further traumatize people with mental 
illness, making them more at risk of harming themselves or 
others.111 This is particularly true in regards to suicide, which is 
the second-highest reason for death after illness in jails.112 These 
high suicide rates are closely linked with untreated depression, 
all too common in all correctional facilities.113 To further 
complicate the situation, many jails lack the institutional mental 
health resources required to serve the needs of their detainees.114 
Pretrial detention also exerts a burden on an indicted 
offender’s family. Children of indicted offenders often end up in 
foster care or are otherwise taken away from their families and 
                                                                                                     
http://www.alternet.org/story/69576 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (detailing how 
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are far more likely to fall into poverty.115 Family members of the 
person in jail experience not only emotional and economic 
hardships, but some have also reported experiencing physical 
ailments and declining health.116 In Michigan, courts have gone 
so far as to incarcerate a mother for being unable to pay for her 
child’s incarceration costs, locking her up without even any crime 
charged.117 
Pretrial detention also augments the possibility of 
conviction.118 Incarcerated defendants before trial are more likely 
to be found or plead guilty and serve prison time than those 
released pretrial.119 The mere possibility of pretrial imprisonment 
often compels defendants to plead guilty and give up their right 
to trial.120 The prospect of being incarcerated, even for a short 
time, can look ruinous to poor defendants, as this often means the 
loss of their livelihood, severe disruptions to their family lives, or 
both. Accordingly, when confronted with an unaffordable bail, a 
large number of pretrial detainees simply plead guilty.121 This 
rush to a guilty plea is often exacerbated by the application fee to 
use a public defender in some states, as detailed above.122 
Finally, pretrial detention can, in some cases, be literally 
deadly. Privatization of jails, prisons and halfway houses in 
states such as New Jersey have resulted in the housing of violent 
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JUSTICE IN THE SHADOWLANDS 1321 
convicted offenders with nonviolent pretrial detainees.123 More 
than once, this mixture of low-level detainees with dangerous 
convicted felons has resulted in injury or death for those who 
cannot make bail for misdemeanor charges.124  
All of these practices are transforming our imposition of 
pretrial detention from its original incarnation as brief 
confinement based on risk of flight to punitive incarceration 
decided by a fragmented and inconsistent variety of private and 
public actors. This creates two major problems: not only do our 
procedures for imposing jail and denying bail disproportionately 
affect the poor and disenfranchised, but, as I contend below, they 
also violate the spirit of the Sixth Amendment. Taken together, 
these practices have created a Shadowlands where the normal 
promises of substantive and procedural criminal justice do not 
apply. 
E. Punishment Before Conviction Violates the Spirit of the Sixth 
Amendment Jury Trial Right 
This prolonged pretrial incarceration feels troubling because 
it seems to punish accused offenders before conviction by 
members of the community, violating the very spirit of our 
criminal justice system. These offenders are considered innocent 
at this phase of the criminal process. Any discomfort we feel with 
such practices logically stems from the Sixth Amendment jury 
trial right, which holds that the accused “shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”125 Our 
current pretrial detention practices violate the very tenets of the 
Sixth Amendment: the accused are incarcerated for lengthy 
periods, suffering punitive and dangerous conditions in jails and 
county lockups, based on decisions made by unaccountable 
private actors, harried magistrates, or line prosecutors. 
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 124. See id. (detailing the murder of a man, arrested for unpaid parking 
tickets and failure to purchase car insurance, for the three dollars in his pocket). 
 125. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
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Punishment, in other words, is being imposed on those not yet 
convicted, without the imprimatur of the jury. 
Our pretrial detention practices are even more questionable 
when contrasted against the Supreme Court’s recent spate of 
opinions highlighting the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 
Specifically, in the Apprendi-Blakely line of cases, the Supreme 
Court reinvigorated the Sixth Amendment jury right, 
concentrating on the need for the community, as jury, to impose 
punishment on those found guilty. By focusing on this basic 
idea—a valid conviction requires all aspects of a crime be 
determined by a jury—the Court “provided the basis for [its] . . . 
decisions interpreting modern criminal statutes and sentencing 
procedures.”126 The Court relied heavily on the historical role of 
the community as an arbiter of punishment to support its 
contention that only the jury could find facts that increased a 
convicted offender’s penalty. In holding that a court can sentence 
a defendant only on facts found by the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt or admitted by the defendant himself,127 the Blakely Court 
gave strong support to the idea that the community must have 
the final word on criminal punishment. Thus, the basis of the 
Court’s new focus on the rights of the jury in criminal 
adjudication rested on the importance of the community’s 
determination of punishment. 
Despite these recent decisions, bail and jail determinations 
still take place far from the community and the jury room, taking 
place in the barrens of procedural justice. The Court’s focus on 
community participation in criminal adjudication was not limited 
to criminal trials, as is illustrated in its recent opinion in 
Southern Union v. United States,128 holding that a jury must 
decide on the imposition of a criminal fine.129 The Court’s refusal 
to limit Blakely/Apprendi to jury trials leaves an opening to 
integrate the community jury right into the pretrial detention 
sphere. If the Supreme Court has focused on the jury as a 
                                                                                                     
 126. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 200, 230 (2005). 
 127. See id. at 313 (“If a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized 
punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the 
State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quoting 
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588–89 (2002))). 
 128. Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012). 
 129. See id. at 2357 (holding that Apprendi applies to criminal fines). 
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representative of the community, as the only appropriate body to 
impose punishment on a convicted offender, then how much more 
important is it that the community have a say in determining 
whether punitive conditions fall upon an unconvicted offender? 
The Apprendi-Blakely line of decisions, forbidding imposition of 
punishment until the jury has decided guilt or innocence, must 
inform our practices governing pretrial detention. 
Imposing our bail and jail procedures upon pretrial detainees 
results in the imposition of unjustified punishment, taking place 
virtually unnoticed and unremedied. As such, the spirit of the 
Supreme Court’s recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence should 
also apply to pretrial detention in a variety of circumstances. 
Whenever detention turns from regulatory to punitive, the 
community must have a say in the punishment imposed. 
Looking back at both our constitutional and historical 
understanding of bail, it is difficult to understand how we got 
here, routinely meting out punishment to an accused not yet 
convicted of a crime. Our historical bail practices differed greatly 
from the complicated and often bewildering array of rules that 
govern pretrial detention today. Thus, a thorough understanding 
of the history of pretrial detention is critical to fully 
comprehending the problems we face today.  
III. A Short History of Bailing and Jailing 
Although the history of Anglo-American bail procedures has 
been well-covered, a brief review of how bail and jail evolved in 
this country both before and after the American Revolution will 
prove helpful in showing how far we have departed from our 
original understanding of both. Since the Supreme Court has 
shown a great fidelity to how bail was originally granted in 
deciding pretrial detention cases, we should strive to comprehend 
the actual working customs during the nation’s earliest days. 
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A. Colonial Practices 
The practice of bail came over from England with the first 
colonists.130 The system of bail developed to free untried 
prisoners.131 Like so many of our current criminal procedures, the 
bare bones of colonial bail were originally quite simple: the 
accused had a friend or neighbor take a pledge, backed by 
property, and assume responsibility for him until trial.132 In 
determining bail, the judge usually considered such factors as 
likelihood of conviction, risk of flight, severity of sentence, and 
the character of the accused.133 Many of these provisions were 
aimed at limiting judicial discretion in bail decisions, not at 
providing liberty for the defendant.134 This is unsurprising, 
considering how much criminal justice in the Anglo-American 
world was focused on community justice. Early colonial 
communities were loath to allow a visiting magistrate to make 
any major decisions about one of their own offenders.135  
In 1628, the English Petition of Right, thought by many to be 
the indirect progenitor of colonial bail law,136 held that bail was to 
obtain “the liberty of the subjects”137 from pretrial imprisonment. 
                                                                                                     
 130. See W. THOMAS, BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 11 (1976) (“The American 
system of bail is derived from practices that originated in medieval England.”). 
 131. See Betsy K. Wanger, Note, Limiting Preventive Detention Through 
Conditional Release: The Unfulfilled Promise of the 1982 Pretrial Services Act, 
97 YALE L.J. 320, 323 n.19 (1987). Wagner goes on to note that this system 
developed largely because magistrates in medieval England traveled among 
different counties, and permitting defendants to be released into the custody of 
friends or neighbors as a surety helped avoid their prolonged detention in jail. 
Id. Originally the surety had to deliver himself if the defendant absconded; 
later, the surety could forfeit money instead of his own person. Id. 
 132. DANIEL FREED & PATRICIA WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES: 1964, 
at 1–3 (1964). 
 133. June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery 
of Basic Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 517 
(1983). 
 134. See Hermine Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 60 GEO. 
L.J. 1140, 1162–63 (1972) (indicating that the purpose of these provisions was 
to limit the “admittedly unlimited discretion” of the judges regarding bail to 
ensure that noncapital defendants had a right to bail). 
 135. See id. 
 136. See Donald B. Verrilli Jr., Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Right 
to Bail: Historical Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 350 (1982). 
 137. 3 How. St. Tr. 80–224.  
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It was this understanding of the right to bail that the colonists 
brought with them from the mother country. Excluding capital 
cases, defendants were guaranteed release on bail before trial.138 
On the American continent, right to bail provisions existed in 
several colonial charters and was articulated as early as 1641 in 
the Massachusetts Body of Liberties.139 Other colonies such as 
Pennsylvania,140 Delaware,141 and New York142 followed suit. Of 
                                                                                                     
 138. See Shima Baradaran & Frank McIntyre, supra note 15, at 499 n.1 
(citing 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 289 
(1676)). 
 139. See MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES, art. 18 (1641), available at 
http://www.winthropsociety.com/liberties.php. Article 18 provided:  
No man's person shall be restrained or imprisoned by any authority 
whatsoever, before the law hath sentenced him thereto, if he can put 
in sufficient security, bail, or mainprise, for his appearance and good 
behavior in the meantime, unless it be in capital crimes, and 
contempts in open Court, and in such cases where some express act of 
Court doth allow it. 
Id.  
 140. See FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, art. XI (May 5, 1682), 
reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS, 
AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW 
OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (FRANCIS N. 
THORPE, ED., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/pa04.asp. Article XI held that “all 
prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses, 
where the proof is evident, or the presumption great.” Id.  
 141. Delaware adopted the Pennsylvania Frame of Government, including 
its bail provision, when it became a colony in 1702. Verrilli, supra note 136, at 
337. 
 142. See NEW YORK CHARTER OF LIBERTIES, art. 19 (1683), reprinted in 
CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK (Rochester 
N.Y, 1906), available at http://www.montauk.com/history/seeds/charter.htm. 
Article 19 provided: 
THAT In all Cases whatsoever Bayle by sufficient Suretyes Shall be 
allowed and taken unlesse for treason or felony plainly and specially 
Expressed and menconed in the Warrant of Committment provided 
Alwayes that nothing herein contained shall Extend to discharge out 
of prison upon bayle any person taken in Execucon for debts or 
otherwise legally sentenced by the judgment of any of the Courts of 
Record within the province. 
Id. However, there is some evidence that New York’s right to bail provision was 
honored more in the breach than in the execution. Few acknowledged a right to 
bail in the eighteenth century. See J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 502–03 (1944) (finding that neither 
defendants nor courts in New York viewed bail as a matter of right). 
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course, as many major crimes were still classified as capital 
felonies during the colonial era,143 any provisions granting bail in 
noncapital cases still excluded numerous defendants. 
B. Bail Following the Constitution 
Despite these specific discussions of bail in colonial 
documents, however, the Framers did not explicitly include a 
right to bail in the Constitution, only mentioning it in the context 
of the Eighth Amendment.144 Depending on how colonial history 
is interpreted, the lack of an explicit right to bail in the 
Constitution can be seen either as a historical accident145 or a 
deliberate decision.146 There is minimal documentary evidence of 
the Framers’ intent to support either position.147 In contrast, the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 did specifically provide a right to bail for all 
noncapital cases,148 although there is no evidence of any debate 
on that provision either.149 The Northwest Ordinance, passed by 
                                                                                                     
 143. See TODD R. CLEAR, GEORGE F. COLE & MICHAEL D. REISIG, AMERICAN 
CORRECTIONS 72–73 (2008) (noting that the Anglican Code in force during the 
mid-Eighteenth Century listed thirteen capital offenses). As the authors note, 
slightly more than twenty percent of felonies were capital ones in New York. See 
id. at 73. 
 144. The Eighth Amendment provides, among other things, that “[e]xcessive 
bail shall not be required.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
 145. See, e.g., Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. 
PA. L. REV. 959, 968–69 (1965) (arguing that the failure to include a right to 
bail in the Constitution was a historical accident).  
 146. See, e.g., William F. Duker, Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. 
L. REV. 33 (1977) (arguing that nothing in the colonial history of bail or the 
history of the Bill of Rights evidences any intent to have a right to bail). 
 147. See Verrilli, supra note 136, at 338 n.58. According to the 1788–90 
Annals of Congress, the discussion of the bail clause in the Eighth Amendment 
was limited to one comment. See id.  
 148. The Judiciary Act provided, in regards to bail: 
[U]pon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except 
where punishment may be by death, in which cases it shall not be 
admitted but by the supreme or a circuit court, or by a justice of the 
supreme court, or a judge of a district court, who shall exercise their 
discretion therein, regarding the nature and circumstance of the 
offense, and of the evidence, the usages of law. 
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 33 (codified as 1 Stat. 91) (repealed by 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3141–3151 (1982)).  
 149. Verrilli, supra note 136, at 338 n.58.  
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Congress in 1787, also contained a right to bail.150 On the whole, 
then, it is difficult to determine the particular intent of the 
Framers in regards to the right to bail.151 
Following the ratification of the Constitution, the federal 
judiciary made clear that bail was the norm following 
indictment,152 due to the presumption of innocence and due 
process.153  
The right to bail after 1789 also solidified through the vehicle 
of state constitutions. Specifically, although only two of the 
original colonies—North Carolina and Pennsylvania—retained a 
specific right to bail in their state constitutions, every state that 
joined the Union after 1789, excluding West Virginia and Hawaii, 
included a right to bail.154 This right managed to survive the 
“frequent redrafting of state constitutions that occurred during 
the nineteenth century.”155 Viewed another way, it was truly in 
the state constitutions that the American right to bail reached its 
full fruition.156 
This fully articulated state right to bail is important for a 
variety of reasons. First, most criminal law is state law, not 
federal law, despite the scholarly and popular focus on federal 
law enforcement.157 Second, bail rights expanded their reach as 
                                                                                                     
 150. See Northwest Ordinance § 14, art. 2 (1787), reprinted in DOCUMENTS 
ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 
(Charles C. Tansill, ed., Government Printing Office 1927), H.R. DOC. NO. 398, 
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nworder.asp. The bail 
provision in Article 2 was identical to the Pennsylvania Frame of Government’s 
bail provision, providing that “[a]ll persons shall be bailable, unless for capital 
offenses, where the proof shall be evident or the presumption great.” Id.  
 151. See Verrilli, supra note 136, at 350 (finding that it is impossible to 
determine the Founders’ intent by evidence drawn from before 1789).  
 152. Granted, many felonies during this time were classified as capital 
offenses. See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (including as capital crimes 
treason, murder, piracy, counterfeiting, and robbery on the high seas).  
 153. See Ex parte Milburn, 34 U.S. 704, 710 (1835) (holding that bail is not 
“designed as satisfaction for the offense, when it is forfeited and paid; but as a 
means of compelling the party to submit to the trial and punishment, which the 
law ordains for his offense”); see also Taylor v. Tainter, 83 U.S. 366, 371–72 
(1872). 
 154. Verrilli, supra note 136, at 351. 
 155. Id. at 352. 
 156. See id. (detailing the history of bail provisions in initial state 
constitutions and right-to-bail amendments). 
 157. This is particularly true with bail, as state and local detention practices 
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most state criminal justice codes eliminated many felonies from 
the list of capital crimes, generally leaving only murder and 
treason.158 Third, the historical right to bail, as articulated by the 
states, has only denied bail for reasons involving risk of flight, 
rejecting the newer preventative detention theories.159 Finally, 
this development shows that the right to bail, although not firmly 
rooted in a specific constitutional provision, has been part of the 
American criminal justice system since the founding of the 
country.  
Moreover, how a specific right developed in state statutes has 
often been important to the Supreme Court when analyzing the 
scope of rights in the federal constitution. For example, in Jones 
v. United States,160 the Supreme Court looked at how the states 
treated certain aspects of an aggravated crime as either an 
element or a sentencing factor in determining whether the reach 
of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right required defining serious 
bodily harm as an element of federal carjacking, as opposed to a 
sentencing factor.161 Similarly, in Duncan v. Louisiana,162 the 
Supreme Court used the long history of jury trial rights in state 
constitutions to bolster its support for the jury trial right in the 
federal constitution.163 
                                                                                                     
“have come to mold and define the operations and limits of the criminal justice 
system.” Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 15, at 346.  
 158. See Verrilli, supra note 136, at 352 (noting that the constitutional 
amendments giving a right to bail occurred at a time where many states were 
pruning the definition of capital crimes to include only murder and treason). 
 159. Granted, many states have recently amended their constitutions to 
allow detention. Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 15, at 345. 
 160. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 236 (1999) (stating that the 
court’s finding of serious bodily injury after trial and consequent sentence 
enhancement was error since serious bodily injury was an element of the crime). 
 161. See id. at 236–37 (reviewing how “many States use causation of serious 
bodily injury or harm as an element defining a distinct offense of aggravated 
robbery”). 
 162.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all state criminal 
cases which would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee if they were 
tried in a federal court). 
 163. Id. at 153 (discussing how every state joining the Union subsequent to 
formation had the right to a jury trial articulated in its constitution); see also 
Verrilli, supra note 136, at 354.  
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Thus the historical right to bail, both as commonly practiced 
around the time of the Founding and afterwards in the various 
states, has much to teach us about how bail rights today should 
be understood and defined, particularly in light of the 
preventative detention proposals that are currently fashionable. 
C. Recent Bail Reforms 
The basic form of bail, relying on the personal surety as the 
custodian of the defendant, remained unchanged until the mid-
nineteenth century.164 However, because these bail custodians had 
to be both known and acceptable to the courts, the personal surety 
system eventually morphed into the commercial bondsman 
system.165 This switch “substantially reduced the courts’ ability to 
assess the risks of pretrial release,” and—combined with the 
decreasing number of nonbailable crimes—added to the general 
trend whereby judges set high bails exceeding a defendant’s ability 
to pay.166 The imposition of high bail remained the status quo in the 
state bail world.  
Federal bail remained relatively unchanged from the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 until 1966, when Congress passed the first bail reform 
act.167 The 1966 Bail Reform Act168 marked a return to conditional 
release, and was designed in large part to reduce the high bails 
imposed by judges to prevent release of certain defendants.169 The 
1966 Bail Reform Act relied heavily on custodial supervision to 
ensure proper behavior, requiring judges to consider a variety of 
release conditions and release defendants under the most minimal 
                                                                                                     
 164. Wanger, supra note 131, at 323–24. 
 165. See id. (finding that the increased urbanization of American society 
made finding a custodian known and acceptable to the court far more difficult). 
 166. See id. 
 167. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146–3153 (repealed 1983).  
 168. Id. 
 169. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, (quoting ATTORNEY GENERAL’S TASK FORCE ON 
VIOLENT CRIMES, FINAL REPORT 50–51 (1981), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182, 3187–88) (determining the goals of the 1966 Bail Reform Act were to “cut[] 
back on the excessive use of money bonds and provid[e] for flexibility in setting 
conditions of release appropriate to the characteristics of individual 
defendants”). See generally W. THOMAS, BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 164 (1976). 
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release strictures possible.170 A major goal of the 1966 Act was to 
reduce pretrial flight.171 Pretrial detention based on future 
dangerousness was not envisioned.172 
The difficulties of successfully implementing the 1966 Bail 
Reform Act, such as setting the terms of release and ensuring that 
conditions were met, along with worries about the crimes committed 
by defendants out on conditional release, led to the passage of the 
1984 Bail Reform Act (BRA).173 This federal statute was paralleled 
on the state level by no fewer than thirty-four states articulating 
specific statutory provisions allowing detention based on a 
defendant’s dangerousness, as opposed to a risk of flight.174  
The BRA was predicated on protection of the public and 
community safety, making this factor one of the most critical in the 
determination of whether to release or detain defendants before 
trial.175 Most states have followed the path of the BRA, with forty-
five states and the District of Columbia specifically permitting the 
determination of dangerousness as a predicate for denying pretrial 
release.176 
                                                                                                     
 170. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (1966) (allowing release upon conditions such as 
personal recognizance; execution of an unsecured appearance bond; third party 
custody; travel, association or living restrictions; execution of an appearance 
bond; and/or execution of a bail bond).  
 171. Wanger, supra note 131, at 329.  
 172. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146–3153 (repealed 1983) (failing to consider pretrial 
detention based on future dangerousness).  
 173. See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 15, at 344 (stating that crime 
committed by persons on pretrial release was a major concern for legislators 
after the 1966 Bail Reform Act).  
 174. Id.  
 175. The Act provides, among other things, that defendants should be 
granted bail “unless . . . such release will not reasonably assure the appearance 
of the person . . . or will endanger the safety of any other person or the 
community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (1988).  
 176. See Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 15, at 507. As Baradaran and 
McIntyre note,  
In determining whether the accused is too dangerous to release prior 
to conviction, state courts consider three main categories: (1) the 
circumstances surrounding the present offense charged, (2) the 
defendant’s past conduct, and (3) judicial discretion regarding the 
defendant’s circumstances and character. Many states use the first 
two categories in an attempt to objectively determine which 
defendants pose a risk to public safety. 
Id.  
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Technically, the 1984 Bail Reform Act reaffirmed the idea 
that pretrial release was to continue to be the norm.177 However, 
the 1984 Act lacked neutrality regarding the determination of 
future dangerousness. For example, the Act contains little to 
balance out the reliance on predicting dangerousness for the 
defense side. Evidence of other crimes may be presented as 
hearsay, which is not subject to cross-examination.178 There is no 
notice to defendants that prosecutors may seek pretrial detention 
based on prior crimes or behavior.179 Additionally, the 1984 Act 
does not require that there be any confrontation between the 
defendant and the prosecutor who proffers the evidence.180  
Moreover, purporting to be deeply concerned with 
“community safety,” the 1984 Bail Reform Act allows federal 
prosecutors to request pretrial detention for any felony committed 
after two or more convictions of federal or state crimes of 
violence.181 The Act contains a rebuttable presumption favoring 
detention whenever a defendant has a prior conviction of a 
violent crime less than five years prior and was arrested while on 
conditional release pending trial for another offense.182 The BRA 
grants authority to the courts to confine an indicted individual 
based on “the danger a person may pose to others if released.”183 
Additionally, under the 1984 BRA, there is no requirement of 
evidence of a substantial possibility of the defendant’s guilt.184 
And there are no limits on the length of detention beyond the 
requirements of the Speedy Trial Act and the vague limits of the 
Sixth Amendment. In sum, the requirements for pretrial 
detention under the 1984 Act only require a quick hearing with a 
                                                                                                     
 177. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a) (1988).  
 178. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1988) (providing that the “rules concerning 
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials do not apply to the presentation and 
consideration of information at the hearings”). 
 179. See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 15, at 347. 
 180. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1988). 
 181. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A)–(E) (1988) (listing requirements for a 
request for detention). 
 182. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2) (1988). 
 183. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 3 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 
3185.  
 184. See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 15, at 348 (stating that Congress 
expressly rejected the District of Columbia Act’s requirement of evidence of a 
substantial possibility of the defendant’s guilt). 
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few limited procedural protections, primarily focusing on whether 
the defendant’s prior acts or convictions make it “necessary” to 
deny bail for community safety purposes.185 
Finally, applying the seven-part test laid out by the Court in 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez186 to determine whether an Act of 
Congress is penal or regulatory in character proves that the 1984 
BRA, as it operates today, is fairly punitive in nature. The 
Mendoza-Martinez test has seven distinct questions to determine 
the character of a Congressional Act: 
[W]hether it involves an affirmative disability or restraint, 
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, 
whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, 
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of 
punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the 
behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an 
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is 
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation 
to the alternative purpose assigned.187 
Applying Mendoza-Martinez to the 1984 BRA illustrates its 
largely punitive nature. Five out of its seven factors point to this 
conclusion. First, the Act involves an obvious restraint: pretrial 
detention. Second, detention has been traditionally regarded as a 
punishment in this country,188 so much so that bail was 
historically required in all but the most heinous of charged 
crimes. Third, pretrial detention cannot promote either 
retribution or deterrence, because it is imposed before conviction. 
Fourth, the behavior to which the Act applies may be a crime, but 
that fact has not yet been determined, by either a jury or a judge. 
                                                                                                     
 185. See id. at 349 (detailing the shortcomings of the act). 
 186. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
 187. Id. at 168–69. 
 188. Two glaring exceptions to this general rule, of course, are the 
administrative detentions of immigration holds and continuing civil 
incarceration of sex offenders.  See, e.g., Matter of Sanchez, 20 I&N Dec. 223, 
225 (BIA 1990) (characterizing an immigration detainer as “merely an 
administrative mechanism to assure that a person subject to confinement will 
not be released from custody until the party requesting the detainer has an 
opportunity to act”) (citing Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 80 n. 2 (1976)); see 
also United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) (holding that the federal 
civil-commitment statute authorizes the Department of Justice to detain a 
mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date the prisoner 
would otherwise be released). 
JUSTICE IN THE SHADOWLANDS 1333 
On the other hand, the Act applies with no regard to scienter, 
just a mere showing of probable cause by the prosecutor.  This 
disregard for criminal intent points to a more neutral, non-
punitive rationale for the Act.  Moreover, it can be argued that 
the stated alternative purpose for pretrial detention—
incapacitation—is rational, although tremendously overused. 
Overall, however, putting the Act through the seven Mendoza-
Martinez questions shows that it is currently penal in character.  
Despite the Act’s flaws, the Supreme Court upheld the 1984 
Bail Reform Act against a substantive due process facial 
challenge in United States v. Salerno.189 Decided on narrow 
grounds, Salerno concluded that the Act was not unconstitutional 
in its determinations weighing the defendant’s interest in liberty 
against the government’s interest in community safety.190 
Rejecting the Southern District of New York’s reasoning that our 
criminal justice system can only hold persons accountable for past 
actions, not anticipated future ones,191 the Salerno Court found 
that merely detaining a person “does not inexorably lead to the 
conclusions that the government has imposed punishment.”192 
The Salerno Court’s conclusion was based on its belief that the 
regulatory goal that Congress sought to achieve in the 1984 BRA 
was not punishment, but public safety.193  
The Salerno Court carefully noted that it was only looking at 
the 1984 Bail Reform Act as created by Congress, not as actually 
applied. As such, it reserved the right to decide the point “at 
which detention in a particular case might become excessively 
prolonged, and therefore punitive, in relation to Congress’ 
regulatory goal.”194 It is possible that by doing so, the Court was 
signaling that it would prefer to wait and strike down a 
particular detention order when the defendant could show his 
interest in liberty outweighed the state’s interest in community 
                                                                                                     
 189. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746–51 (1987) (upholding the 
constitutionality of federal pretrial detention of a defendant in order to protect 
the community from danger). 
 190. See id. at 741 (“We hold that, as against the facial attack mounted by 
these respondents, the Act fully comports with constitutional requirements.”). 
 191. Id. at 745.  
 192. Id. at 746. 
 193. Id. at 747.  
 194. Id. at 747 n.4.  
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safety.195 Nonetheless, the Salerno Court’s upholding of the Bail 
Reform Act struck a blow to concepts of retributive criminal 
justice (the belief that a wrongdoer can only be punished for 
crimes he or she has actually committed).  
The Salerno Court, however, used some sleight of hand 
between the actual language of the 1984 Bail Reform Act and the 
way it justified the Act. One of the ways the Court defended the 
idea of pretrial detention exclusive of the risk of flight was by 
arguing that the government had a legitimate and compelling 
interest in preventing crime by arrestees.196 
Preventing future crime, though, is a different endeavor than 
public safety for the community, the purported reasons behind 
the 1984 BRA. Although of course crime prevention does, in a 
very general sense, enhance public safety, few crimes are so 
dangerous that their very potential requires detention of a 
suspect. And the most dangerous of them, murder, is usually 
barred from bail release in any case. Nonetheless, the Salerno 
Court easily conflated future crime prevention and community 
safety into one amorphous concept. Moreover, as other scholars 
have noted, the Court evaded the BRA’s underlying problem of 
identifying the actual circumstances that transform detention 
into punishment.197 
Salerno also specifically addressed two constitutional claims 
involving the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, quickly dismissing 
them both.198 Regarding the Fifth Amendment substantive due 
process claim—that pretrial detention constituted impermissible 
punishment before trial199—the Court held that because the 
                                                                                                     
 195. See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 15, at 351 (“[T]he Court would 
likely prefer instead to wait and declare unconstitutional any particular 
detention order in which the defendant could show that the state's interest in 
community protection failed to outweigh his or her interest in liberty.”). 
 196. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748–49 (1987) (stating that 
the government may utilize pretrial detention when its regulatory interest in 
community safety outweighs an individual’s right to liberty and giving 
examples). 
 197. See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 15, at 353 (“The Court avoided, 
however, the underlying problem of identifying circumstances that make 
detention punishment.”).  
 198. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746, 751–52 (rejecting a facial challenge under 
the Fifth and Eighth Amendments).  
 199. See id. at 746 (summarizing respondents’ argument). 
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legislative intent of Congress in the Bail Reform Act was not 
punitive, the pretrial detention was not punishment, but 
regulation.200  
As for the Eighth Amendment claim—that the 1984 Bail 
Reform Act violated the Excessive Bail Clause because this clause 
grants a defendant the right to bail based solely on the 
considerations of flight201—the Salerno Court flatly rejected this 
argument, holding that nothing in the text of the Bail Clause 
limits bail decisions solely to questions of flight.202 However, the 
Salerno Court did not provide any historical evidence to support 
this conclusion about the Eighth Amendment, simply leaving the 
assertion to stand alone.203 As discussed briefly above,204 although 
the specific intent of the Framers regarding bail cannot be 
conclusively determined, all the available evidence points to the 
fact that pretrial detention, both under English common law and 
at the time the Constitution was written, was limited to flight 
risks. Thus, the Salerno Court’s rejection of the Eighth 
Amendment challenge on this basis is undersupported at best.  
Given the changes made to the historical right to bail, our 
newfound reliance on preventative incarceration, and the 
Supreme Court’s recent focus on the Sixth Amendment’s jury 
trial right, our current pretrial detention procedures may require 
some substantive changes. In Part IV, I explore the problem with 
our current system’s reliance on future dangerousness to 
routinely imprison indicted offenders and contend that this 
violates our understanding of the role of punishment as dictated 
by the Sixth Amendment. 
                                                                                                     
 200. Id. at 747.  
 201. See id. at 752 (summarizing respondents’ argument). 
 202. Id. at 754.  
 203. Id. at 753. The Salerno Court did carve out a space to decide later 
whether “the Excessive Bail Clause speaks at all to Congress’ power to define 
the classes of criminal arrestees who shall be admitted to bail,” but maintained 
the validity of the Bail Reform Act even then. Id. at 754.  
 204. See supra Part III.B. 
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IV. Preventative Detention, Future Dangerousness, 
and the Sixth Amendment 
There is convincing evidence that modern-day bail and jail 
practices result in punishment for the indicted defendant 
incarcerated before trial. Although usually the underlying 
reasoning for the imposition of pretrial detention is not based on 
a punishment rationale, the consequences of such decisions are 
often so severe that the end results are punitive.  
This punishment before conviction creates numerous 
problems for our current bail and jail structure. First, many 
offenders are denied bail based on the relatively new field of 
preventative detention, which is one riddled with errors, both in 
theory and in practice. Second, although Salerno has seemingly 
closed off both due process and Eighth Amendment attacks 
against the 1984 Bail Act, there have not yet been any challenges 
based on the Sixth Amendment ban on punishment imposed 
before a conviction and without a jury’s imprimatur. Third, and 
relatedly, if we follow the dictates of the Sixth Amendment jury 
trial right, the community must take part if any punishment is to 
be imposed on an offender. Below I explore how these factors—
the mistaken reliance on preventative detention, the holes left by 
Salerno, and the requirements of the Sixth Amendment—all 
converge to make our current pretrial detention hearings in need 
of reform. 
A. The False Promise of Preventative Detention 
In the federal system, preventative incarceration, or 
detaining the accused based on the potential of future crime, did 
not become popular until the 1984 Bail Reform Act.205 In the last 
twenty years or so, many states have followed suit, allowing their 
criminal justice systems to detain the indicted individuals based 
on their future dangerousness. Both judges and academics have 
challenged the bases for this type of determination, however, 
putting the entire theory to question. 
                                                                                                     
 205. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (1988).  
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1. Barefoot v. Estelle 
One year before Congress passed the 1984 Bail Reform Act, 
the Supreme Court discussed a similar issue regarding the 
propriety of nonjury actors determining and punishing for future 
dangerousness. In Barefoot v. Estelle,206 the Supreme Court 
agreed with the lower trial court that the use of psychiatric 
experts to discuss the potential dangerousness of the defendant 
at trial was permissible because this type of determination was 
for the jury to decide: “Such disputes are within the province of 
the jury to resolve. Indeed, it is a fundamental premise of our 
entire system of criminal jurisprudence that the purpose of the 
jury is to sort out the true testimony from the false, the important 
matters from the unimportant matters . . . .”207 Put another way, 
the majority of the Barefoot Court underlined the importance of 
the community’s role in deciding whether a fellow member of the 
public is so dangerous as to deserve incarceration on that basis. 
This decision, however, focused on the propriety of determining 
dangerousness during an actual trial, not during a pretrial 
detention hearing. 
More important for our purposes, the dissent in Barefoot 
highlighted the role of the jury as the proper arbiter of decisions 
involving a defendant’s incarceration. Penned by Justice 
Marshall, the dissent noted that psychiatrists and other experts 
might actually be “less accurate predictors of future violence than 
laymen,”208 in part because the lay public lacks a personal bias 
leaning towards predicting violence, which can arise from being 
responsible for the erroneous release of a violent individual.209 If 
this is true for psychiatric experts, it is also likely to be true for 
magistrates and trial judges, especially those state court judges 
who must submit to the pressures of periodic re-election.  
The dissent also focused on a key critique that applies widely 
to all determinations of potential future dangerousness: the 
                                                                                                     
 206. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 903 (1983) (finding that “[e]xpert 
testimony, whether in the form of an opinion based on hypothetical questions or 
otherwise, is commonly admitted as evidence where it might help the factfinder 
do its assigned job”).  
 207. Id.  
 208. Id. at 922 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 209. Id. at 922 n.4.  
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general unreliability of these predictions.210 Citing several 
studies, the dissent pointed out that long-term prediction of 
future violence by psychiatrists continues to be extremely 
inaccurate.211 This is due in part to the difficulty of identifying 
any sub-class of offenders who have a greater than fifty-fifty 
chance of re-engaging in assaultive conduct,212 the conduct with 
which future dangerousness is most concerned. Indeed, a ninety 
percent error rate is common.213  
All these concerns are focused, of course, on testimony given 
to the jury by expert psychiatric witnesses during an actual trial. 
How much more unreliable are those hasty predictions by an 
untrained magistrate or trial judge, determining future 
dangerousness of a person who has not yet been convicted? At the 
minimum, the incarceration of an accused individual due to his 
potential to commit more crimes should be based on stronger 
science than gut feelings or past conduct, and should admit some 
aspect of community participation. 
2. Preventative Detention’s Binary Nature 
The unreliability of accurately determining future 
dangerousness, however, is not the only problem with current 
imposition of pretrial detention. As other scholars have argued, 
our present pretrial detention model is extremely binary, refusing 
to account for gray areas.214 Gray areas, however, repeatedly 
occur in determining eligibility for pretrial release: “[A] binary 
model requires a decision maker to round off the evidence and 
                                                                                                     
 210. See id. at 920 (discussing how “‘the unreliability of . . . predictions of 
long-term future dangerousness is by now an established fact within the 
profession,’” and noting that “two out of three predictions of long-term future 
violence made by psychiatrists are wrong” (citing Brief for American Psychiatric 
Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) 
(No. 82–6080))).  
 211. Id. at 920.  
 212. Id. (citing Wenk, Robinson & Smith, Can Violence Be Predicted?, 18 
CRIME & DELINQ. 393, 394 (1972)).  
 213. Id. at 921 n.2.  
 214. See Jack F. Williams, Process and Prediction: A Return to a Fuzzy 
Model of Pretrial Detention, 79 MINN. L. REV. 325, 327 (1994) (“The prevalence of 
pretrial detention is largely a function of our bivalent system of law . . . .”).  
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confine the case to total truth or no-truth to make a decision.”215 
Accordingly, our current bail system fails to account for the 
varying degrees of detainability, dangerousness, and culpability 
that indicted offenders present.216  
Due to the limitations of the binary model, many of the 
judicial determinations that lead to pretrial detention are overly 
harsh or punitive.217 This is especially true when it comes to 
predicting future dangerousness. Neither experts nor courts have 
had much success in accurately determining if and when an 
offender might commit more crimes.218 Granted, there have been 
some more recent studies that have provided a far better 
prediction rate than the older evidence.219  Despite the existence 
of such new predictive materials, however, many harmless 
defendants are still unfairly detained as dangerous based on old 
or outdated beliefs.220 
The term dangerous itself can be quite vague when it comes 
to detaining pretrial defendants. The 1984 Bail Reform Act failed 
to define the term at all.221 Thus the idea of determining 
dangerousness to the community is an incredibly broad concept, 
which could encompass almost anything, from physical danger to 
conspiracy. The problem with this imprecision of terminology is 
that accurately determining dangerousness requires a narrow 
focus, which the determination of bail so notably lacks. 
                                                                                                     
 215. Id.  
 216. Id. at 327–28.  
 217. See id. at 327 (criticizing the binary model for its inability to take into 
account “partial degrees of truth”).  
 218. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 919–22 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(emphasizing this problem with the current system); See also Joseph J. Cocozza 
& Henry J. Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: 
Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084, 1097 (1976) (finding 
“dangerous” patients no more so than nondangerous patients); John Monahan, 
The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Second Generation of Theory and 
Policy, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 10 (1984) (arguing that dangerousness predictions 
are wrong approximately 95% of the time).  
 219. See generally Baradaran & McIntyre, Predicting Violence, supra note 
15, passim. 
 220. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & DON M. GOTTFREDSON, 
DECISIONMAKING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TOWARDS THE RATIONAL EXERCISE OF 
DISCRETION 122–27 (1980) (articulating reasons that predictions of 
dangerousness for indicted offenders are often unreliable).  
 221. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)–(g) (2006) (failing to define the term). 
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All of this imprecision means that judging future 
dangerousness within our current pretrial detention scheme can 
be quite arbitrary. Forcing a black or white decision onto a mass 
of gray evidence (particularly since it is evidence that has not yet 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt) makes many bail 
hearings unreliable and inconsistent. 
3. Adjudicating Dangerousness 
The problems with determining future dangerousness, 
however, do not end there. Even if future dangerousness can be 
accurately predicted, should that necessarily mean that 
dangerousness should always equal detention and punishment?  
Although the question of dangerousness has been widely 
discussed in terms of sentencing, the scholarly exploration of the 
topic, both procedurally and jurisprudentially, has been rather 
limited as applied to pretrial detention. It is this gap that I aim to 
fill. 
Norval Morris famously addressed using predictions of future 
behavior to determine whether a criminal should be imprisoned 
after conviction.222 As he noted, “as a matter of justice we should 
never take power over the convicted criminal on the basis of 
unreliable predictions of his dangerousness.”223 Morris was 
concerned that dangerousness was so expansive a concept that 
“the punitively minded” would use it to classify all offenders, 
deserving or not.224  
Moreover, as other scholars have observed, dangerousness is 
“peculiarly seductive” because it can be ascribed as a personal 
characteristic of the offender, not a judicial imposition.225 And 
when dangerousness is seen as a personal trait, it leads to 
confusion between the determination of dangerousness and the 
determination of desert, when both usually animate the reasons 
underlying punishment.226 Likewise, Andrew von Hirsch has 
                                                                                                     
 222. See generally NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974). 
 223. Id. at 73. 
 224. Id. at 72. 
 225. See Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Dangerousness and 
Criminal Justice, 85 MICH. L. REV. 481, 492 (1986).  
 226. Id.  
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argued that the moral argument against predictive detention “is 
that it is not deserved. This objection stands even were the 
prediction of future criminality accurate.”227  
If all these objections exist for the convicted defendant, how 
much more do they resonate for the offender who is only indicted? 
In 1968, before the passage of the 1986 Bail Reform Act, the 
American Bar Association rejected pretrial preventative 
detention, even for “dangerous” offenders, because too little was 
known about the actual need for this type of detention and of the 
predictive techniques used.228 Although this ship has clearly 
sailed, the theoretical issues still remain.  
Whether one’s take on desert is animated by limits, 
proportionality, or by the parity principle, the theory of desert is 
simply inapplicable to pretrial detention because no 
determination of crime has yet been made. Predictive 
dangerousness, when not based on accurate, up-to-date empirical 
evidence, has no place in any rational system of retributive 
justice, and yet it is a commonplace determination in American 
bail hearings, where it seems least appropriate.  
Although the Supreme Court in Salerno rejected both the 
procedural229 and substantive230 due process claims, it failed to 
discuss the more theoretical problems with judging future 
dangerousness. The Salerno Court took for granted that 
dangerousness is a fixed term with a fixed meaning, as opposed to 
its actual amorphous nature, difficult to chart or pin down. As 
such, it is truly inappropriate for use at the pretrial detention 
hearing, at which judges have neither the time nor the 
                                                                                                     
 227. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENT 
125 (1976). Granted, von Hirsch admits a small fraction of offenders should be 
confined by preventative detention, including those who have extensive violent 
records and who were convicted of serious assault crimes. Id. at 125–26. 
 228. See Zimring & Hawkins, Dangerousness and Criminal Justice, supra 
note 225, at 496 n.28 (citing ABA Standards Relating to Pretrial Release § 5.5 
commentary at 69 (1968)).  
 229. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (holding that 
“the provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail Reform Act of 1984 fall within 
that carefully limited exception”).  
 230. See id. at 750–51 (rejecting the claim that an individual’s right to 
liberty always outweighs the government’s interest in protecting the 
community).  
1342 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297 (2012) 
inclination to theorize about how desert might be applied to 
offenders who have not yet been convicted.231  
This uncertainly and ambiguity of standards in pretrial 
detention matters because determining dangerousness is a 
central preoccupation of the criminal justice system.232 In part 
because of this, the reliability of preventative detention is a hotly 
debated topic. As Christopher Slobogin has noted, there is a two-
part challenge to the reliability of predictive dangerousness: 
(1) persons should not be denied liberty on dangerousness 
grounds unless there is a high degree of certainty that the person 
will offend in the near future; and (2) this sort of proof of 
dangerousness is nearly impossible to obtain.233 Responses to 
these concerns have included the charge that even proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt has its own unreliabilities as an indicator of 
culpability and predictor of future dangerousness.234 
For example, the Barefoot Court held that the inconsistencies 
inherent in predicting future dangerousness, even in regards to 
the death penalty, are largely eradicated by the adversarial 
process, which usually exposes erroneous views.235 As the 
                                                                                                     
 231. As Dan Markel and Eric Miller noted in an op-ed for the New York 
Times, “state and municipal judges, who handle the overwhelming number of 
criminal cases, face less public scrutiny than federal judges,” and thus worry 
less about the social repercussions of pretrial detention. Dan Markel & Eric 
Miller, Op-Ed., Bowling, as Bail Condition, N. Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012, at A17. 
 232. See Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003) (stating that dangerousness assessments play a role in 
“death penalty determinations, non-capital sentencing, sexual predator 
commitment, civil commitment, pretrial detention, and investigative stops by 
the police”). 
 233. Id. at 3.  
 234. See id. at 7–8. As Slobogin explains in greater detail: 
First, imposition of the reasonable doubt standard [for predictive 
detention] is overly stringent when the state’s goal is to prevent 
rather than to punish. Second, the belief that the criminal law 
permits conviction only when there is no reasonable doubt about 
blameworthiness is based on a misconception about the reliability of 
assessments made in criminal cases; in fact, the culpability 
determinations that provide the primary basis for criminal 
punishment are subject to serious inaccuracy. Third, requiring a high 
degree of danger is inconsistent with the fact that many of the crimes 
that penalize dangerous activity require very little in the way of 
predictive validity. 
Id. at 6–7. 
 235. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983). 
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argument goes, if we can rely on the shaky credibility of 
predictive dangerousness to justify an execution, how could it not 
justify regular pretrial detention, where no life is lost? 
The answer, of course, is specific to pretrial detention. First, 
there is no adversarial contest in the typical pretrial detention 
hearing, as there is no right to appointed counsel during bail 
determination. As the vast majority of those detained without 
bail are those who cannot afford counsel on their own, it is rare to 
see defense counsel appear at these hearings.236 Accordingly, the 
prosecutor usually presents her reasons why the indicted offender 
should not be granted bail, with no response by the defense, and 
the judge decides. 
Second, there is a large difference between assessing future 
dangerousness for a convicted offender, who is subject to 
punishment of some kind, and assessing the same for someone 
who has not even been subject to conviction. Taking away the 
liberty of a person convicted beyond a reasonable doubt (or who 
has admitted his or her guilt) is a far more acceptable matter 
than imprisoning someone whose very guilt is still in doubt. 
Finally, as Paul Robinson has convincingly argued, “[i]t is 
impossible to punish for dangerousness.”237 This is because, in 
both theory and actuality, deserved punishment can only exist in 
relation to actual wrongs done, not potential or imagined future 
wrongs.238 In other words, “one can restrain, contain, or 
incapacitate a dangerous person, but one cannot logically punish 
dangerousness.”239 Thus it is not only unfair but theoretically 
unsound to punish indicted offenders with pretrial detention for 
                                                                                                     
 236. Although in DeWolfe v. Richmond, No. 34, Sept. Term, 2011, 2012 WL 
10853 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jan. 3, 2012), the Maryland Court of Appeals recently 
attempted to require counsel for all pretrial detainees, in April 2012 the 
Maryland Legislature amended the public defender statute to remove the right 
to counsel at commissioner hearings but mandated counsel at the initial judicial 
bail review. See Maryland Public Defender Act, MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. 
§§ 16-101 to -403; see also Paul DeWolfe, Reducing Pretrial Detention in 
Maryland, Audacious Ideas (Apr. 30, 2012, 8:04 AM), http://www.audacious 
ideas.org/2012/04/reducing-pretrial-detention-in-maryland/ (last visited Sept. 
24, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 237. Paul Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventative 
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (2001). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 1432. 
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their potential future dangerousness. Dangerousness and desert 
are two very different concepts,240 and should not be conflated 
together in the realm of pretrial detention. 
4. Empirical Evidence and National Trends 
The actual work of determining dangerousness is a chancy 
business, filled with pitfalls and indeterminacy. To predict the 
dangerousness of the defendant, courts tend to analyze the 
nature of the charged crime and combine this information with 
their knowledge of his or her past conduct.241 The court then adds 
to this assessment its own determination of the accused’s 
circumstances and character.242 In many states, a more subjective 
judicial assessment permits courts to consider the totality of the 
defendant’s circumstances and character.243 This aspect of 
determining dangerousness, then, is highly influenced by the 
court’s personal feelings and quirks. Despite the claim for 
scientific accuracy, the determination of dangerousness is far 
more based on subjectivity than objective factors. 
As a whole, predicting pretrial crime is a dubious science.244 
In fact, our assumptions about who might be mostly likely to 
reoffend before trial are often not borne out. For example, as 
demonstrated by one of the few large empirical studies done on 
defendants released before their trials, those charged with violent 
crimes are not necessarily more likely to be rearrested pretrial.245 
                                                                                                     
 240. Id. at 1438. 
 241. See Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 15, at 508–10. As Baradaran 
and McIntyre show, there are five states that allow for an even deeper look into 
a defendant’s background by allowing judges to factor the defendant’s past 
conduct into their determination. Id. at 511. 
 242. See id. (noting that this factor is much broader to allow for judicial 
discretion).  
 243. See id. at 510. As the authors note, some state statutes include a list of 
factors with an “including but not limited to” clause, or permit judicial officers to 
consider “any other factor” relevant to making a determination of 
dangerousness. Id. at 511.  
 244. Id. at 523. 
 245. See id. at 528. As the authors point out:  
The highest rearrest rates pretrial are for defendants charged with 
drug sales or robbery (21%), followed by motor vehicle theft (20%), 
and burglary (19%). Those released who are charged with the ‘more 
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Nationally, 16% of defendants released on bail are rearrested for 
any reason, and 11% are rearrested for a felony.246 Particularly 
important for our purposes, only 1.9% of all defendants released 
on bail before trial are rearrested for a violent felony.247 Thus, one 
prong of the furor over “dangerous” indicted defendants is 
blunted; if only a tiny percentage of all defendants released on 
bail go on to reoffend with violent crimes, then perhaps our fear 
over the danger posed by the pretrial defendant to the community 
is overblown.  
Moreover, this same study shows that those charged with 
violent crimes are not necessarily more likely to be rearrested 
pretrial.248 Critically, the research done by Baradaran and 
McIntyre illustrates that although those defendants charged with 
violent crimes have the highest likelihood of being rearrested on 
bail, there is still huge variation in how dangerous these violent 
crime defendants can be, depending on the specific crime 
charged.249 Thus, simply being charged with a violent crime does 
not automatically create a presumption of dangerousness as 
many courts believe.  Ultimately, despite the large variety of 
assessments of pretrial “dangerousness,” the defendants granted 
bail before trial are often far less threatening to public safety 
than most people would anticipate.250 
Interestingly, the greatest predictor for future pretrial crime, 
dangerous or not, is the existence of past arrests.251 It is 
                                                                                                     
dangerous crimes,’ such as murder, rape, and felony assault, have 
much overall lower rates of pretrial rearrest at 12%, 9% and 12% 
respectively. 
Id. 
 246. See id. at 527.  
 247. See id. 
 248. See id. Granted, those charged with violent crimes are more likely to be 
rearrested for violent crimes on release. See id.  
 249. See id. at 528. For example, those defendants charged with murder 
have a 6.4% violent crime rearrest rate, one of the highest. Similarly, those 
defendants charged with robbery have a 5.8% chance of rearrest for violent 
crime, those defendants charged with rape at 3.2% chance of rearrest for violent 
crime, and those defendants charged with assault reoffend at a rate of 2.9%. See 
id. at 528–29.  
 250. See id. at 529.  
 251. See id. at 536 (“A person’s number of previous arrests is a large 
predictor of future rearrest; however, whether or not that prior arrest turned 
into a conviction is largely irrelevant as an additional predictor.”). 
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important to note that analysis of prior convictions shows that 
even defendants with multiple prior convictions are still unlikely 
to be rearrested for a new violent crime while on release.252 
This information can help us find a better way of predicting 
“dangerousness” than our current fumbling in the dark. The 
charged crime, by itself, is a poor predictor of a threat to the 
community, except for the most violent ones (such as murder, 
which usually is statutorily prevented from bail release in any 
case). The existence of multiple past convictions for similar crime 
seems to have the most predictive effect, although even those 
pretrial recidivism rates are low.  
Accordingly, relying on our current system of judicial and 
prosecutorial decision-making regarding pretrial release—which 
relies primarily on the charged crime—is not only unfair, but 
largely ineffective. And considering that roughly 62% of the 
overall jail population consists of pretrial detainees,253 these 
decisions make a huge difference. Accordingly, if we are going to 
continue to use predictions of future dangerousness to determine 
the imposition of pretrial detention, as is likely, we should at 
least provide courts with the best and latest empirical evidence 
on the subject. 
Finally, on the broadest level, post-9/11 case law has also 
raised important questions about the permissible scope of all 
pretrial confinement.254 Do the 9/11 detainee cases affect the law 
governing other detainees, whether held in state or in federal 
custody, either before or after conviction?255 At least one 
prominent scholar has answered the question affirmatively, 
                                                                                                     
 252. See id. (finding that only 5% of all defendants have more than a 5% 
chance of being rearrested on a violent felony charge when released on bail). 
 253. See id. at 37 (finding that in 2007, 62% of the overall jail population 
consisted of pretrial detainees). 
 254. See Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal 
Courts: An Essay in Honor of Henry Monaghan, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 586 
(2010) (“The 9/11 case law has prompted diverse assessments, with arguments 
that the judiciary has done too much, or too little, or left unanswered important 
questions about the permissible scope of executive detention and surveillance 
powers.”). 
 255. See id. at 583. Resnik points out that “As [Henry] Monaghan noted, 
these questions are at the core of the shifting conception of federal courts 
jurisprudence, once preoccupied with the ‘relationship between state and federal 
law’ and the sometimes ‘irritating difficulty’ of sorting between the two kinds.” 
Id. at 583 n.19. These issues arise with state courts as well.  
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arguing that the law created in addressing the extraordinary 
detainment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay is “continuous with 
judicial responses to the central challenges, faced daily, by 
governments trying to maintain peace and security and, hence, 
incapacitating some individuals feared likely to inflict grave 
harm to the social order.”256 This is because the criminal justice 
system has always had to address uncertainty about how much 
harm a detainee might do, whether in the context of 9/11 or of 
more familiar kinds of criminality and border regulation.257  
Put another way, criminal charges range in a wide 
continuum from minor crimes to terrorism. In all these cases, 
however, the government “must still distinguish among and 
classify detainees to justify why a particular subset is to be 
confined in more restrictive conditions than others, and for longer 
periods of time.”258 The crimes may differ, but the determinations 
are still the same. 
The six post-9/11 cases decided by the Supreme Court have 
held that the Constitution requires some procedural justice for all 
detainees, even those held at Guantanamo Bay.259 Applied to 
pretrial detention, this conclusion signals that it is time to import 
some fairness and procedural justice into the bail hearing, since it 
is part of the same continuum of pretrial detention.  
Integrating emerging 9/11 law with state and local laws 
governing confinement is an important task. Doing so highlights, 
among other things, the state’s job in addressing serious 
challenges in securing safety, whether locally, nationally, or 
worldwide.260 As Judith Resnik has pointed out, “[s]orting the 
dangerous from the benign is a daunting task.”261 This is 
particularly true because neither courts nor legislatures have 
                                                                                                     
 256. Id. at 584.  
 257. Id. at 585. As Resnik notes, “Governments regularly desire to obtain 
information through intense interrogations aimed at preventing injuries and at 
apprehending wrongdoers, and governments regularly detain various persons. 
Courts in turn have, over the last several decades, ruled many times on the 
legality of detention and of confinement conditions.” Id. at 584. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 581. 
 260. See id. at 587 (“[T]he state regularly faces tremendous challenges in 
securing safety, at both local and global levels.”). 
 261. Id. 
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been able to come to any sort of consensus over the years 
regarding who should be detained and who may be freed.262 
For example, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,263 the defendant, a 
Pakistani national, was detained for almost a year in the 
Metropolitan Detention Center in New York. Part of that time he 
was in solitary confinement, because of a claim that his identity 
papers were false.264 Iqbal was deported to Pakistan after his 
period of governmental detention.265 Iqbal sued the government 
for his treatment period of confinement, during which he alleged 
that he was subjected to cruel and inhumane conditions.266 The 
Iqbal Court held, among other things, that courts could limit 
individual accountability and civil liability for the harms imposed 
during detention, thereby protecting those officials who were 
involved in such detention programs.267 Although Iqbal is 
obviously a case that can be classified as a post-9/11 terrorism 
case, its disturbing lesson resonates for all pretrial detainees, and 
illustrates how the lack of proper bail procedures can extend to 
defendants both high and low. 
Ultimately, similar problems plague both the general 
procedures of pretrial detention and the small body of 9/11 law.  
This includes the existence of only a tiny batch of procedural 
remedies instead of a more robust body of constitutional 
constraints in response to wide-ranging complaints of abuse.268 
The lax oversight, minimal supervision, and extreme deference to 
governmental decisions and jailors continue to be issues for 9/11 
detainees, detained aliens on immigration holds, and indicted 
defendants confined in pretrial detainment. All three are held 
with little procedural justice due to often nebulous fears of 
dangerousness. All three types of experiences linger in the arena 
of pretrial detention. 
                                                                                                     
 262. See id. at 588 (discussing the historical conflicts between legislature 
and judiciary). 
 263. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009) (finding that “qualified 
immunity . . . shields Government officials”). 
 264. See id. at 667. 
 265. See id. at 668. 
 266. Id.  
 267. Resnik, supra note 254, at 633. 
 268. Id. at 635. 
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B. Salerno, the 1984 Act, and the Sixth Amendment 
The problems with Salerno are larger than just its failure to 
grapple with the concept of future dangerousness. Viewed in the 
aftermath of the Court’s subsequent decisions in the Apprendi-
Blakely line of cases, Salerno’s decision that a court may 
incarcerate a defendant on the basis of potential danger to the 
community seems to contradict the spirit of the Sixth 
Amendment. If, as I contend, the imposition of pretrial detention 
in today’s jails is a form of punishment, then the community must 
have some say in the matter. Although there have been numerous 
challenges to the 1984 Bail Reform Act, none have been based on 
the Sixth Amendment jury trial right. Below, I detail how and 
why such a challenge might be successful. 
1. Salerno Did Not Close the Door 
Most practitioners and scholars have concluded that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Salerno pronounced the death knell 
for challenges to preventative detention. This is not entirely true. 
The Salerno Court specifically noted that it was foreclosing a 
facial challenge to the 1984 Bail Reform Act,269 not foreclosing all 
challenges for the future: “We hold that, as against the facial 
attack mounted by these respondents, the Act fully comports with 
constitutional requirements.”270 As such, an as-applied challenge 
to the 1984 Act is still entirely feasible. 
The Salerno Court seemed to leave more than one door open 
to indicate its willingness to revisit its decision upholding the 
constitutionality of the 1984 Act. First, it began the analysis of 
the Act with a warning that a facial challenge to a legislative act 
was one of the most difficult at which to succeed, since the 
challenged “must establish that no set of circumstances exists 
under which the Act would be valid.”271 In other words, for the 
                                                                                                     
 269. As the Salerno Court held, “We are unwilling to say that this 
congressional determination . . . on its face violates either the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).  
 270. Id. at 741.  
 271. Id. at 745 (emphasis added).  
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defendants to succeed in challenging the 1984 Act on facial 
grounds, they would have had to prove that the Bail Reform Act 
could never operate constitutionally.272 The Salerno Court even 
hinted that it might be willing to find some aspect of the 1984 
Bail Reform Act unconstitutional under certain circumstances, 
but simply not here: “The fact that the Bail Reform Act might 
operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of 
circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid.”273  
Moreover, the Salerno Court carefully carved out space for 
future, as-applied challenges to the Act, noting in a footnote that 
they “intimate[d] no view on the validity of any aspects of the Act 
that are not relevant to respondents’ case.”274 Although not 
precisely an invitation to bring an as-applied challenge, the 
Supreme Court certainly allowed for the future possibility. 
2. Pretrial Detention as Punishment Under the 1984 BRA 
Even in its rejection of the defendants’ facial challenge, the 
Salerno Court carved out an exception to its holding: when 
pretrial detention becomes punishment. Of course, simply 
because a defendant is detained does not mean that he is being 
punished.275 Traditionally, we look to legislative intent to 
determine whether a restriction on liberty, like pretrial 
detention, is more like punishment than like regulation.276 Unless 
Congress intended on imposing punishment, whether a 
restriction on liberty is classified as punitive or regulatory 
depends on whether there is an alternative purpose related to the 
restriction and whether this restriction seems excessive in 
                                                                                                     
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 745 n.3.  
 275. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979) (“Not every disability 
imposed during pretrial detention amounts to ‘punishment’ in the constitutional 
sense.”).  
 276. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984) (“Absent a showing of an 
express intent to punish on the part of the State, that determination generally 
will turn on ‘whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may 
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in 
relation to the alternative purpose assigned.’” (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963))). 
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relation to the original goal.277 In Salerno, the Supreme Court 
decided that the 1984 Act, addressed facially, had a legitimate 
regulatory goal (preventing danger to the community) and that 
the incidents of pretrial detention were not excessive in relation 
to that regulatory goal.278 
Whether the Act’s legislative intent was regulatory or not, 
however, the constitutionality of the scheme is far different when 
the effect of pretrial detention results in punishment. The 
Salerno Court itself reserved the right to decide on the 
constitutionality of a situation in which “detention in a particular 
case might become excessively prolonged, and therefore punitive, 
in relation to Congress’ regulatory goal.”279 This was particularly 
important in this case because, as a facial challenge, Salerno only 
addressed theoretical pretrial detention, not actual pretrial 
detention as experienced by indicted defendants. 
Much of pretrial detention, whether based on fears for 
community safety or flight risk, has an effect virtually 
indistinguishable from punishment. Thus, despite Salerno’s 
decision facially upholding the 1984 Act, there is nothing 
precluding a court from finding pretrial detention 
unconstitutional under certain punitive circumstances. 
3. Applying the Sixth Amendment to the BRA 
Salerno rejected the facial challenge to the 1984 Act under 
both the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, but did not evaluate any 
Sixth Amendment claims. As such, there is nothing prohibiting 
an attack on Salerno’s defense of predictive dangerousness based 
on the argument that only a jury can make factual findings that 
result in the imposition of punishment on an offender. 
In Salerno, the Court first tackled the Fifth Amendment 
claim, in which the defendants argued that the Act violated the 
substantive Due Process Clause because the pretrial detention it 
authorized constituted impermissible punishment.280 The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument, focusing on the 
                                                                                                     
 277. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963).  
 278. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987). 
 279. Id. at 747 n.4. 
 280. See id. at 746 (summarizing respondents’ argument). 
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regulatory nature of the Act.281 Next, the Court addressed the 
Eighth Amendment argument, in which the defendants argued 
that the Act violated the Excessive Bail Clause.282 The defendants 
argued that the Excessive Bail Clause granted them a right to 
bail calculated solely upon considerations of flight.283 The Salerno 
Court also rejected this argument, holding that “nothing in the 
text of the Bail Clause limits permissible Government 
consideration solely to questions of flight.”284  
Salerno, however, did not address the Sixth Amendment 
implications for the 1984 Act, as the defendants did not raise the 
issue on appeal. Additionally, a Sixth Amendment claim at the 
time of the Salerno decision, in 1986, would have been fruitless. 
Now, however, after the Apprendi-Blakely line of cases, an 
application of the current understanding of the Sixth Amendment 
jury trial right, focusing on the community’s right to be the 
arbiter of punishment, makes more sense.  
Although it did not address the issue, Salerno left room for 
the application of our more recent understanding of the Sixth 
Amendment. First, in its discussion of the Due Process Clause 
challenge, the Salerno Court noted that even the Government 
had not argued that pretrial detention could be upheld if it were 
punishment.285 Second, as noted above, the Court carved out an 
exception for cases in which detention might become “excessively 
prolonged,” thereby converting to punishment.286  
In its discussion of the Eighth Amendment excessive 
punishment challenge, the Salerno Court was careful to note that 
its decision did not implicate the question of whether the 
Excessive Bail Clause affects the legislative power to delineate 
who might be eligible for bail.287 In this way, the Court left room 
to determine whether and how pretrial detention can be 
punishment. It is this space that I will explore through the 
dimensions of the Sixth Amendment community jury trial right. 
                                                                                                     
 281. See id. (concluding that the detention imposed by the Act is regulatory, 
not punitive). 
 282. See id. at 752–53 (summarizing respondents’ argument).  
 283. Id.  
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 746. 
 286. See id. at 749 n.4. 
 287. See id. at 754. 
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C. Punishment, Community Rights, and Pretrial Detention 
In Blakely v. Washington,288 the Supreme Court held that the 
jury is the only body that can find facts that increase the 
maximum punishment for an offender.289 Put another way, 
Blakely contended that a criminal offender must have a jury, or 
the local community, make the determination to impose any type 
of punishment.290 Our revitalized understanding of the Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right applies to all aspects of our criminal 
justice system, from indictment to criminal fines291 post-prison 
release. In fact, our Sixth Amendment constitutional guarantees 
should apply with more force to the pretrial stage, since at this 
point the offender still maintains the presumption of innocence. 
Yet, the spirit of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right has yet to 
be applied to the pretrial detention determination stage. 
1. Future Dangerousness in Adversarial Context 
When we apply the spirit of the Sixth Amendment jury trial 
right to the pretrial detention hearing, many problems with our 
bail procedures are illuminated. One such problem is the lack of 
adversarial context when determining the future dangerousness 
of an indicted offender. Since the adversarial process is crucial for 
the proper community understanding and imposition of 
punishment, the lack of it raises equity and possibly even 
constitutional concerns. 
Although the 1984 Bail Reform Act does permit a federal 
indicted defendant the right to legal assistance, the right to cross-
examine prosecution witnesses, and the right to testify and 
                                                                                                     
 288. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 296 (2004) (“Because the facts 
supporting petitioner’s exceptional sentence were neither admitted by petitioner 
nor found by a jury, the sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by 
jury.”). 
 289. Id. 
 290. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005) (applying 
Blakely to Federal Sentencing Guidelines, making Guidelines advisory); 
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 296. 
 291. See Southern Union v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012) (applying 
Apprendi-Blakely to the imposition of criminal fines). 
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present witnesses in her own defense,292 the accused does not 
have a right to compulsory process.293 Indeed, evidence submitted 
by the prosecutor may be submitted by proffer.294 Moreover, in 
the states, the amount of disclosure required varies widely; some 
districts comport with Brady requirements, and some do not. 
Moreover, the lack of the right to appointed counsel at the 
pretrial detention stage means that the vast majority of 
defendants do not have any legal representation.295 
The failure to require full disclosure of evidence by the 
prosecutor at the pretrial detention stage means that indicted 
defendants often cannot challenge the evidence presented by the 
Government to establish the accused’s future dangerousness. 
Although the Supreme Court has held that the pretrial detention 
hearing does not generally require “the full panoply of adversary 
safeguards,”296 the establishment of potential dangerousness by 
the government is such a questionable area that perhaps this is 
one aspect of the hearing that the adversary process should 
apply. Especially because the standard of evidence required from 
the prosecutor at this stage is relatively low—only probable 
cause297—it seems only fair that the accused get a greater 
disclosure of evidence when she is subject to potential detention 
based on dangerousness.  
More and better disclosure of prosecutorial evidence is 
important to help the offender challenge the request for pretrial 
detention.298 When the defense lacks knowledge of the evidence 
                                                                                                     
 292. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2006). 
 293. Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Due Process at the Pretrial Detention Stage—What 
Will Become of the Innocent?—A Call for Pretrial Discovery Rules, 46 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 452, 452 (2010). 
 294. Id. 
 295. But see DeWolfe v. Richmond, No. 34, Sept. Term, 2011, 2012 WL 
10853 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jan. 3, 2012) (mandating appointed counsel for all 
pretrial detainees). 
 296. Gerstein v. Pugh. 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (stating that probable cause 
determination can be made using informal procedures and without an adversary 
hearing). 
 297. See id. at 464 (stating that “the prosecutor is only required to show 
probable cause that the accused has committed the offense attributed to him in 
addition to proving the ground of detention: obstruction of justice or 
dangerousness”). 
 298. See id. at 465 (“Disclosure could be of paramount importance to the 
accused in contesting the evidence against him.”). 
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against him, the defendant cannot properly challenge the 
detention request, meaningfully participate in the hearing, or 
refute any secret evidence because the proceeding is one-sided.299 
This lack of adversary context and one-sided nature of the 
detention hearing also implicates the spirit of the Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right. If, as the Apprendi-Blakely line of 
cases instructs us, the community is supposed to decide all 
potential punishments for an offender after observing the 
adjudicatory process, and punishment is being imposed on the 
offender during pretrial detention, then there should be some sort 
of adversarial process during the detention hearing. Although a 
full adversarial procedure would not be feasible, a detention 
hearing should provide a few more procedural safeguards. At the 
very least, this should include the requirement of a minimum 
proffer of prosecutorial evidence at the hearing, proved by a 
standard of probable cause, in any case in which the indicted 
defendant might potentially be detained due to community safety 
concerns. Of course, for this proffer to have meaning, defense 
counsel would have to be provided for those indigent offenders at 
the hearing. 
2. Post-Blakely, Community as Only Arbiter of Punishment 
Of even more concern to the application of the Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right is the belief that the community 
should be the primary arbiter of punishment for all offenders. 
The guarantee that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to . . . trial, by an impartial jury” promises a 
criminal offender that “all the facts which must exist in order to 
subject the defendant to a legally prescribed punishment must be 
found by the jury.”300 This interpretation of the Sixth Amendment 
jury trial right ultimately became law in Blakely.301 
This animating principle behind Blakely—that the 
community should determine all punishment to be meted out to 
                                                                                                     
 299. Id. at 466. 
 300. Apprendi v. New York, 530 U.S. 466, 499 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 301. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301–02 (2004) (holding that to 
increase a sentence beyond the maximum suggested by the Guidelines, a jury 
must find the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt). 
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the defendant—has import for not just the jury trial, but for other 
areas of criminal procedure too. Blakely applied first and 
foremost to sentencing, but there is no reason why it should not 
be applied to the pretrial detention hearing as well.  This holds 
particularly true after the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Southern Union, holding that any punishment rendered by the 
courts, including criminal fines, should have its facts determined 
by a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt.302 Southern Union helps 
bolster the belief that Blakely is applicable to all types of criminal 
procedures, from the front-end to the back-end. 
Recent conditions in pretrial detention centers have rendered 
any sort of time in them a form of punishment in addition to all 
the negative externalities that flow from a pretrial loss of liberty. 
Not only is this punishment imposed before a determination of 
guilt, but it is also imposed by a judge, not a jury—a violation of 
the Sixth Amendment jury trial right to determine facts relevant 
to punishment for a criminal offender. The question becomes, 
then, under what circumstances does the judicial determination 
of pretrial detention transform into punitive measures? When 
denial of bail results in an imposition of punishment, this might 
mean that the community should play a role, particularly in 
determinations of its own safety. 
3. The Community Should Decide Danger to Itself 
Considering that a very popular aspect of pretrial detention 
confines indicted offenders due to an alleged threat to community 
safety, it is ironic that this determination entirely lacks 
community imprimatur. In many cases, members of the 
community would be more familiar with who might be dangerous, 
particularly when it comes to nonviolent drug crimes. In contrast, 
a line prosecutor often has other concerns on his or her mind 
when determining whether an indicted offender may post bail 
before trial. Additionally, judges are not always part of the 
communities they govern, and may be more interested in 
uniformity (or in some cases, re-election) than individual justice.  
Thus there may be a true need for the community voice within 
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the bail hearing procedure. The prosecutor is both technically and 
legally the public’s representative.303 The prosecutor’s function as 
the people’s representative, however, can be subsumed by a 
gradual inclination to align with the government and a desire to 
achieve a positive win-loss record. Too often, prosecutors have 
“their own agendas, both personal and administrative.”304 For 
prosecutors, the concepts of public interest or justice can be too 
diffuse and elastic to constrain them. A prosecutor’s simultaneous 
representation of both the state and the people can get 
submerged in the everyday details of doing her job, particularly 
when the indicted offender is a high-profile defendant and there 
is considerable media scrutiny and pressure on the case.  
Allowing some slice of the community to help determine 
whether the accused is truly a threat to community safety, then, 
makes both logical and ethical sense. First, the community often 
knows the offender far better than either the prosecutor or the 
judge, especially in a state, municipal or local forum. Despite the 
persistent fear of crimes perpetuated by strangers, people tend to 
commit most crimes within their communities.305 As such, some 
representation from the community might help make the best 
determination as to whether the accused might pose a danger if 
granted bail.  
Additionally, granting the community some power to 
determine whether pretrial detention should be imposed would 
also foster a feeling of participation and investment in the 
criminal justice system, something that many members of the 
public lack. Being given the opportunity to make real decisions on 
community safety would hopefully make these citizens, and by 
association, their families and friends, feel far more connected to 
how the criminal justice system works. Put another way, instead 
of envisioning the criminal justice system as a faceless, remote 
                                                                                                     
 303. As the Supreme Court has noted, the prosecution’s interest “is not that 
it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” Berger v. United States, 295 
U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 304. Abraham S. Goldstein, Converging Criminal Justice Systems: Guilty 
Pleas and the Public Interest, 49 S.M.U. L. REV. 567, 569 (1996).  
 305. See Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some 
Thoughts on Saving the Federal Judiciary from the Federalization of State 
Crime, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 503, 508, 516 (1995) (noting that “most crime is local 
in nature, and consequently, the local community feels the brunt of the 
offense”). 
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entity, the local public, through their participation in the pretrial 
detention hearing, would realize that they are part of the justice 
system as well. This would generally promote the legitimacy and 
public confidence in the justice system, something that has been 
lacking of late.  
Finally, having the community become involved with pretrial 
detention determinations will result in the public’s increased 
understanding of the criminal justice system. Particularly with 
high-profile cases, the current nontransparent procedures 
determining pretrial detention can create both disappointment 
and a sense of helplessness in the local community. For example, 
when disgraced financier Bernie Madoff was granted bail after 
his confession to the police, the local and international public 
were angered and dismayed.306 The public’s integration into the 
pretrial detention hearing through participation in the procedure 
can eliminate some of the concerns inherent in imposing pretrial 
detention or granting bail by exposing the public to the actual 
discussion and debate over individual bail determinations. 
4. Laymen and Members of Community As Predictors of Danger  
Having an informed segment of the community take part in 
pretrial detention determinations will also help the accuracy of 
the “future dangerousness” predictions. Currently, judges tend to 
use their own intuition to determine how dangerous an indicted 
offender might be, or they rely on a prosecutor’s statement of 
disrupted community safety. This can result in an overprediction 
of future dangerousness. Naturally a prosecutor would have an 
interest in the defendant remaining in custody as long as 
                                                                                                     
 306. See Madoff Debate: Should He Be Free on Bail?, MSNBC.COM (Jan. 7, 
2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28540171/ns/business-us_business/t/mad 
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possible, both to ensure cooperation and to make sure no further 
crimes happen that might reflect negatively on the prosecutor’s 
office itself. Although communities can also fall prey to 
overpredicting dangerousness, in many situations, particularly 
those not involving violent crime, the local public has a more 
nuanced view of the potential liabilities. 
Judges can have a tendency to be biased in favor of 
predicting dangerousness, in part because they will be 
responsible if they erroneously release a violent individual.307 
Additionally, judges, like all experts who routinely make these 
types of dangerousness determinations, may also have a tendency 
to generalize from experiences with past offenders on bases that 
have few, if any, relationships to future violence.308 
Members of the community, on the other hand, lack some of 
these pressures and biases. First, even if they participate in some 
sort of pretrial detention hearing, they would not bear any 
ultimate responsibility if the indicted offender were to commit 
another crime before trial. Equally important, the small cross-
section of the public that would be involved in determining 
whether the accused obtained bail would not have the 
aforementioned tendency to generalize from prior experiences, 
allowing them to make the determination of pretrial detention 
from a fresh perspective.  
5. Attacking the Problems of Race & Gender in Pretrial Detention 
Like the rest of the criminal justice system, the pretrial 
detention procedure is rife with racial and gender-based 
disparities. First, people of color are disproportionately confined 
                                                                                                     
 307. See J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 13, 
22–25 (1981) (noting that psychiatrists might be less accurate predictors of 
future violence than laymen because of personal bias arising from fear of 
responsibility for erroneous release of a violent person). 
 308. See Saleem A. Shah, Dangerousness: A Paradigm for Exploring Some 
Issues in Law and Psychology, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 224, 229–30 (1978) 
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empirical studies of which offenders are most likely to offender, such as that 
provided by Baradaran & McIntyre.   
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in jail, whether for pretrial detention or other reasons.309 Recent 
analysis has shown that both the race and gender of an offender 
can have a significant effect on the likelihood of pretrial 
detention.310  
For example, in federal cases, an offender’s sex affected 
pretrial custody for both black and white offenders; pretrial 
detention was less likely for both black and white females than 
for males of their respective races.311 Likewise, the likelihood of 
pretrial custody was substantially higher for black male offenders 
than for other offenders—twice those for white males, and over 
three times more likely than for black or white females.312 The 
author of the study has suggested that some of this may be due to 
judicial stereotyping of black or male defendants as more 
dangerous than their white or female counterparts, particularly 
when dealing with drug crimes.313 Finally, Latinos are most likely 
of all races to suffer the negative consequences of pretrial 
detention: they are most likely to have to pay bail (as opposed to 
being released on their own recognizance); courts tend to set 
them the highest bail amounts; they are least likely to be able to 
pay; and they are by far the least likely to be released prior to 
trial.314 
Although there is no guarantee that the local community or 
general public would hold less prejudicial attitudes toward 
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 313. Id. at 898–99. See generally Sara Steen, Rodney L. Engen & Randy R. 
Gainey, Images of Danger and Culpability: Racial Stereotyping, Case Processing, 
and Criminal Sentencing, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 435 (2005) (discussing their study of 
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defendants based on race or gender, in some communities, the 
presence of community members could make a difference in terms 
of expanding diversity and representation. Although strides 
certainly have been made to diversify the bar and the bench, the 
fact remains that magistrates and trial judges are primarily 
white315 and defendants are often minorities.316 In certain 
districts, such as the Bronx or East Los Angeles, the presence of a 
few community members would make some diversity that much 
more likely.  
Additionally, the presence of representatives from 
historically minority communities would help make the ultimate 
decision to either grant bail or impose pretrial detention more 
understandable to the local public as well as explain how the 
pretrial detention decision might impact the community. Because 
many minority communities tend to feel alienated or distanced 
from the criminal justice system, the incorporation of some public 
representatives into the bail determination hearing would help 
reduce some of this distance. 
V. Proposal: Reform and Revision 
A. Reforming Bail Bondsmen and Pretrial Release 
One problem that plagues several states is the problem of 
commercial bondsmen. Some states have no commercial 
bondsmen at all, which results in serious problems for the poor, 
who often cannot afford even the small amount comprising their 
bail. Other states have bail bondsmen who do not provide loans 
for small bail amounts. There are a couple of ways to solve this 
problem. 
First, states and counties could expand and better fund their 
pretrial release programs, changing their general policy to one 
that assumes the granting of bail unless there is a serious or 
                                                                                                     
 315. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES—DIVERSITY 
OF THE BENCH (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.judicialselection.us/ 
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 316. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS tbl.6.0022.2011 (2011), available at 
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violent crime involved. Pretrial release programs often allow 
nonviolent or low-level offenders out on bail with supervision, 
using GPS, ankle bracelets, and monitoring.317 Allowing indicted 
offenders out on bail with the help of electronic monitoring 
permits them to save their jobs, pay their bills, keep their homes 
and see their families.318 This would not only prevent nonviolent 
indicted offenders from suffering the dangers and indignities of 
pretrial detention, but also save counties and states thousands of 
dollars in incarceration costs.  
However, pretrial release programs across the country are all 
too often fighting a futile battle with bail bond companies trying 
to either limit these types of programs or completely shut them 
down.319 As one pretrial release program official notes, 
commercial bail bondsmen lobby to keep these programs as 
miniscule as possible, so that they do not siphon off any paying 
customers, even if that means thousands of inmates wait in jail 
at the taxpayers’ expense.320  
Thus, one way to improve the current pretrial detention 
system is to increase local and county pretrial supervision 
programs in conjunction with much broader granting of bail, 
combined with providing appointed counsel for all indigent 
defendants in bail hearings.321 Although these services do cost 
money, in the long term they end up saving far more taxpayer 
dollars, as it is far more expensive to imprison those indicted 
offenders waiting for trial than to supervise them electronically 
at home.322  
                                                                                                     
 317. Laura Sullivan, Bondsman Lobby Targets Pretrial Release Programs, 
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
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 321. As Yale Kamisar has long argued, the bail hearing is a critical phase, 
deserving of effective assistance of counsel.  See, e.g., YALE KAMISAR ET AL., 
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ed. 1994). 
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B. Revising the Bail Hearing Procedure 
Some of the ills of our criminal justice systems can be traced 
to the dissociation between our local communities and their 
ability to effect change on the system. Insufficient local control is 
a serious issue, pervading all aspects of criminal justice. As Bill 
Stuntz persuasively argued,  
To the suburban voters, state legislators, and state and federal 
appellate judges whose decisions shape policing and 
punishment on city streets, criminal justice policies are mostly 
political symbols or legal abstractions, not questions the 
answers to which define neighborhood life. Decisionmakers 
who neither reap the benefit of good decisions nor bear the cost 
of bad ones tend to make bad ones. Those sad propositions 
explain much of the inequality in American criminal justice.323 
This is particularly true in pretrial detention hearings, at which 
the question of whether an indicted defendant is released or not 
before his trial often rests on decisions made by remote 
legislators or senior district attorneys. The local community has 
little or no say in the matter.  
But this result is neither preordained nor necessary. One 
way to get the community more involved in the criminal justice 
process—thus making them feel more invested in the system—is 
to invite their participation in the pretrial detention hearing, 
allowing them to give their opinion on whether the suspect is a 
true threat to community safety.  
Having the community actually involved in determining 
what would best serve community safety, and possibly being 
more lenient regarding the pretrial release of indicted, low-level 
offenders is not such a novel idea. Various scholars have noted in 
the past ten years the social consequences of mass incarceration: 
by incarcerating too many nonviolent criminals, either before or 
after conviction, not only are poor and minority communities 
increasingly harmed by the massive scale of incarceration, but 
many of these nonviolent offenders do become dangerous after 
being exposed to violent criminals in jail or prison.324 Thus, the 
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 324. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence 
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short-term decision to incarcerate pretrial offenders for purposes 
of “community safety” ends up backfiring on a number of levels in 
the long run. 
However, incorporating the community into the bail hearing 
would have many positive results. These positive aspects include 
the public’s increased understanding of the criminal justice 
system, a restoration of criminal adjudication’s educative 
function, and a sense of investment and trust for the local 
community.  
First, and most basically, the current bail hearing process—
like so much else in the criminal justice system—functions out of 
sight from the average citizen. The local public has a meaningful 
interest in uncovering the procedures involved in denying or 
granting bail, especially because so many taxpayer dollars are 
being used to incarcerate those who have not yet been determined 
guilty.  
Moreover, enhancing local, popular participation within an 
existing criminal justice institution,325 such as the bail hearing, 
combines the positives of community involvement without 
requiring new courts or immense change in the existing system. 
Additionally, through citizen involvement, the “cynicism and 
contempt” for the criminal justice system that is invariably 
created by more secret proceedings will be minimized.326 This is 
especially important for communities that have felt distanced and 
isolated by the criminal justice system; by allowing these 
communities to determine whether one of their own is “safe” 
enough to release pretrial, the local public may feel some 
investment or purchase into the workings of the system. 
As Judith Resnik has powerfully argued, “[t]hird-party 
scrutiny illuminates the treatment of suspects, detainees, 
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prisoners, and immigrants, all reliant on government for their 
well-being.”327 Allowing the community to observe and participate 
in the routine preventative detention hearing of a domestic 
defendant, then, would vindicate a number of rights, including, of 
course, the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right. Resnik has made 
a similar suggestion concerning the imposition of detention on 
various detainees or prisoners, proposing a more audience role for 
the public.328 Her comment, however, applies equally to both her 
proposal and mine: “[L]aw ought to oblige open decision making 
when confinement is at stake.”329 
Moreover, allowing a cross-section of the community to make 
decisions on questions of “dangerousness” along with the court 
would provide a less jaded sensibility to the pretrial detention 
determination. Although normally we defer to courts to make 
such decisions, having fresh eyes look at each individual 
situation, from a body that is not beholden to re-election or re-
appointment processes, would inject both transparency and 
fairness into the proceedings. A bail jury, in other words, could 
make decisions informed by their own knowledge of the 
community and unburdened by judicial pressures and biases, 
providing a different view that could be added to the court’s 
determination to provide the fullest range of opinion before 
decision-making. 
This kind of open decision making—and open participation 
by the local public—is most likely to take place in the state court 
system, which processes a vast percentage of pretrial detainees in 
the country. As Resnik notes, “[t]he last few decades have 
brought attention to state courts as a font of constitutional 
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jurisprudence that can be more rights-protective than federal 
precepts.”330 Because of this, it would be easy enough to draw 
from the county jury rolls to create a body of local fact finders for 
bail hearings, who would be selected in a manner similar to those 
citizens selected for the grand jury.  
These “bail juries” could sit for a week or two at a time, 
focusing their decisions on the community safety issue; in other 
words, whether the indicted defendants brought before the court 
would be eligible for bail. If the “bail jury” deemed the defendant 
safe for release out into the community, perhaps using a 
preponderance of the evidence standard,331 and the court had no 
substantive objection, then barring any true evidence of danger to 
the public, he or she would be released either on their own 
recognizance or electronically monitored until trial or guilty plea 
date.  If the bail jury’s determination differed from the judge’s, 
then the court could call for more information from both sides to 
further illuminate the issue, until an agreement is reached. 
C. Potential Problems 
The major possible critiques of a bail jury are two-fold. First 
is one of history: the question of bail has always been left to the 
court, and not the community. Second is the cluster of concerns 
centering around the implementation of a bail jury, its potential 
costs, complexity, and delay. I address both these concerns below. 
1. Lack of Historical Precedent 
Since the practice of granting bail began, the traditional 
arbiter of detention or release has been the court. However, as 
discussed infra Part II, the decision of whether to detain a 
defendant pending trial was always left to the community—
literally, as a friend or neighbor had to stand surety for the 
defendant and house him or her in their own residence.332 The 
various rules that developed regarding bail were, as noted above, 
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aimed more at limiting judicial discretion than anything else—
always a concern in both seventeenth-century England and 
colonial America. Thus even in the earliest of bail systems, the 
community’s voice was heard. 
Additionally, pretrial detention as originally configured was 
based only on risk of flight. There was no incarceration, at a 
neighbor’s house or in a local jail, ever predicated on future 
dangerousness, or community safety. Thus, there is no historical 
precedent limiting the bail decision solely to the judge. On the 
contrary, returning some power to the community would be a 
return to the original bail granting practice, upon which our 
Constitution is based.  
Moreover, the use of a bail jury meshes neatly with the 
recent interest in local control over local environments.333 Various 
advocates of localism argue that “local governments are more 
responsive to the specific needs of unique communities and that 
local institutions can provide better and increased services.”334 
These arguments parallel the one that can be made for the bail 
jury—that the local input is critical in implementing our criminal 
justice system, particularly for issues of community safety. 
2. Impracticality/Cost/Delays 
A second, potentially more serious, critique of the bail jury is 
its impracticality, both in terms of cost and delay. In these 
fiscally stringent times, any procedure that would add to the cost 
structure of the criminal justice process is viewed dubiously at 
best. And incorporating a bail jury into the pretrial detention 
hearing would potentially increase costs; although the bail jury 
could be drawn from the same rolls as the grand jury, the more 
citizens drawn, the more money needed to fund per diems, 
reimburse transportation costs, and pay court staff to organize 
such juries. 
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As noted above, however, the potential amount of savings 
that a properly working bail jury would provide could be vast. 
Even a thirty percent reduction in those incarcerated before trial 
could save the state thousands of dollars. And while there are no 
guarantees that a bail jury would be more lenient on matters of 
pretrial release than the traditional judicial arbiter, it is likely 
that a more informed body of decision makers—i.e., a cross-
section of the community—might not believe that every indicted 
offender is a threat to public safety.  
As for delays, it is possible that the incorporation of the bail 
jury would slow down the pretrial detention somewhat. But that 
is not necessarily a bad thing. Part of the problem with our 
current bail hearings is the speed at which these critical 
determinations happen. Since there is no right to appointed 
counsel at a bail hearing, often they are very fast, as the 
prosecutor presents evidence regarding defendant’s incarceration 
and the court makes a decision. Reducing the haste of the process 
might also ensure that both the court and the prosecutor take the 
process more seriously; since the bail jury will not be criminal 
justice insiders, they will likely focus on each individual case 
more intensely, and require the prosecutor to more fully explain 
her reasoning for denying bail. The court, too, may spend more 
time on the decision, as it will need to incorporate the bail jury’s 
decision into its own. Thus, the delay in imposing pretrial 
detention or granting bail might be a positive one, opening up the 
procedure to some much needed sunshine and scrutiny.  
Although the bail jury does not tidily solve all of the 
problems of our framework of bail and jail, it provides a partial 
solution to some of the glaring inequities of pretrial detention.  
VI. Conclusion 
Reform is desperately needed in the realm of pretrial 
detention to remove it from the Shadowlands of justice. As Resnik 
has persuasively argued, in protecting and preserving rights, 
“Article III judges—the exemplars of independent jurists—can 
never be enough.”335 This is equally true for state court judges 
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and magistrates, many of whom are at the mercy of re-election 
cycles, overwhelming caseloads, and restrictive statutes. 
Although there is no one perfect solution, the use of a bail 
jury, combined with increasing monitored pretrial release, would 
begin to solve both constitutional and procedural problems. First, 
the bail jury would help ameliorate the Sixth Amendment issue, 
allowing the community a chance to help decide any pretrial 
punishment imposed on indicted offenders. Additionally, giving 
local citizens a say in who is released back into their community 
has a practical aspect to it; instead of having the prosecutor and 
the judge, both representatives of the government, be the only 
ones to determine community safety, it makes sense to have some 
input from the very community that the government is trying to 
protect. Second, the addition of increased electronic monitoring of 
those offenders released before trial would be a relatively easy, 
cost-effective way to permit those accused who either cannot 
afford to make bail or about whom the community or judge still 
have some reservations to escape remaining in jail until their 
trial. 
As both a practical measure and a fundamental matter of 
constitutional fidelity, the people should be involved in the 
machinations of criminal punishment. This includes the 
procedures that happen before trial. Our current system of 
pretrial detention lies in shambles, incarcerating those not yet 
convicted in punitive conditions often far worse than those 
existing in prisons. Allowing the community a say in the matter 
and broadening the ambit of those who can be released pretrial is 
one way to shine light into the darkness.  
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